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2001-2002 INTRODUCTION: CONFLICT RESOLUTION
VI. Conflict Resolution in Africa
Introduction
G.E Crovetto, UMICLR Executive Editor
For its first of two volumes for 2001-2002, the International and
Comparative Law Review decided to publish, among others, the
following three powerful articles on Sierra Leone and more generally
what is required for African nations to live in peace. Whatever the
requirements may be, it will be a daunting task of overwhelming
proportions. In reading these articles and in the post September 1 1t"
tragedy, it is all too clear that evil lurks and that peace and prosperity
need to be cherished for they are non-elastic commodities. Thus it is
hoped, these articles will provide to the law student as well as to the
accomplished legal scholar, a comprehensive look at the efforts of a
nation, a region and an international community at achieving and
maintaining peace through legal, diplomatic and politic as well as
economic means.
Sierra Leone by University of Miami International &
Comparative Law Review Editor-in-Chief Ian Martinez exposes the
reader to the history of a country 700 millions carat rich of cursed
diamonds. It is a fascinating story of death, greed, power and waste.
From the English domination and colonial schemes to the Sierra Leonese
themselves, the nation has lost its best and its wealth. Come a new
millennium and the United Nations' (U.N.) renewed efforts and one can
hope, as the author concludes, that Sierra Leone has indeed come full
circle. Perhaps we will see economic development and empowerment for
the honest Sierra Leonese.
Martinez's article does a wonderful job at putting in perspective
the next two articles on Sierra Leone and African Human Rights in
general and providing an insight into what a failure will mean, if it is
anything like a return to the past.
Ademola Abass's article; The Implementation Of ECOWAS
New Protocol And Security Council Resolution 1270 In Sierra Leone:
New Developments In Regional Intervention, provides a much needed
and dreadfully realistic look at the complicated politics of the region and
its players, U.N included. In light of the September, 1 1th tragedy and our
renewed vigor for peace and liberty we can appreciate this piece all the
more. Abass takes us to the trenches, he shows us what it takes to be free
and to live in peace. From the warring front to the war of diplomacy,
from compassion to determination, this is a masterpiece at exploring the
role of the new peacemaking. A peacemaking that requires devotion, risk
taking and vision. The latter is clearly expressed by the Economic
Community of African States (ECOWAS) which set to tailor its own suit
in order to attend its own gala. The U.N. is clearly invited but it needs to
dance in tempo. Abass concludes that ECOWAS is a good partner (if not
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a good instructor) and one can only hope it is the case. As the last article
of this series indicates failure is not an option in Sierra Leone anymore.
New Trends in African Human Rights Law: Prospects of an
African Court of Human Rights by Yemi Akinseye-George examines
African Human Rights Law development in the post colonial era from
1960 to the present in Africa. Akinseye-George details the evolution
stemming from the development of Human Rights Law while exploring
the impetus for the latter change coming to a reality, such as dictators'
obvious lack of care for human rights, the West's blind eye to abuses and
the cold war, and not least, a lack of political will of the part of Member
States with the then Organization of African Unity.
Akinseye-George traces the recent development in African
Human Rights law to the creation in 1981 of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights. This charter effectively became a stepping
stone, through opening the door to international scrutiny, for the
implementation of multiple "generations of rights." The road ahead, from
first generation rights such as equality before the law and right to fair
hearing, presumption of innocence, to second generation rights like those
emboldened by the U.N.'s separation of human rights as an International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, now seems traced. Unfortunately, Africa remains
plagued by problems ranging from politics to treaty implementation (lack
of infrastructure) or even drafting (such as the inclusion in the law of
"clawback clauses"). Thus, even when the African Charter contains
"'corresponding duties which States to the convention are expected to
perform towards the attainment of the objectives of the charter", the
continent still only has one mechanism for enforcement; the African
Commission on Human and People's Rights. And while the Commission
has been successful at times, like most other endeavor in Africa, action
has been delayed and diluted by social, political and cultural difficulties.
Regardless, the impact of the African Charter as Akinseye-
George points out has been tremendous and positive. For example, the
lack of action of the part of government has led to a decentralization of
rights in the pursuance of legal remedies and a private party can now
initiate a human rights violation investigation against a government. In
that light, several states have adopted the Charter as law and the African
Commission has acted as a focus point for African Non-Governmental
Organizations thereby furthering cooperation and helping in exchanges
of ideas. In 1998, the African Court, with for mandate the defense and
application of the African Charter, was created. The Court is to be fast
(with a 90 days deliberation to opinion timeframe) and omnipotent (no
appeals). It seems, perhaps, Africans have now gotten themselves a dog
with teeth to defend their right to democracy.
Finally, the last effort towards democracy and sustainability is
the March 2001 creation of the African Union, based on the European
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Union model with the same economic and community goals in mind.
However, in nothing less than an African twist, Libya's Colonel Gaddafi
was its promoter and the creation of the African Union drew skepticism
from all quarters.
Conclusion
The latest efforts are perhaps the most significant. As U.S.
President George Bush often advocates; there must be consequences to
actions, there must be accountability. It seems the U.N. listened as it
announced on January 3, 2002 that it will put in place an international
tribunal for Sierra Leone to bring to justice those responsible for over
200,000 dead and thousands of mutilated in the last ten years. A
resolution on the implementation of this decision will follow an
upcoming ten day U.N. mission in Freetown to determine the legal
foundation for such tribunal. The financing of this latest move seems
assured as $14 of $16.2 millions in start up costs have already been
contributed.'
This tribunal will now show potential perpetrators of human
rights violations that, in due time, they will be brought to justice and
forced to answer for their actions. The tribunal will also enhances
ECOWAS and the African Charter's [on Human and Peoples' Rights]
efforts to promote democracy, accountability, and conflict deflation.
Thus, the next five years will probably be crucial for Sierra Leone and
for Africa. Both will either be equipped with the tools for economic
development, and democracy will follow or these efforts will be nothing
but stale paper agreements and the status quo will prevail. Africa being
Africa, no one can tell, but everyone hopes.
1 Kofi Annan Vent un Tribunal International pour le Sierra Leone, LE MONDE, Jan. 3, 2002, at 5.
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New Trends in African Human Rights Law: Prospects of an
African Court of Human Rights
Yemi Akinseye-George-
Introduction
African Human rights law refers to the various national, regional
and international legal instruments concerning the liberties of the people
of Africa.1 These include the human rights provisions in the constitutions
of African countries,2 the growing body of case law3 emerging from the
courts and international human rights instruments that are of application
* (LL.B) (Hons.) (LL.M) Lagos, Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, Fellow,
Shelby Cullom Davis Center, Princeton University, Princeton New Jersey, USA (1998-99), Senior
Lecturer and Acting Head, Department of Public and International Law, Faculty of Law, University
of Ibadan, Nigeria.
1 See OSITA EZE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA, 141 (Lagos: Nig. Inst. of Int'l Affairs and Macmillan,
1984); T.O. Elias, Human Rights and the Developing Countries 1-29 (1977); HENRY J. STEINER &
PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, 689-705 (Clarendon Press, 1996);
Asmarom Legesse, Human Rights in African Political Culture 123 (Kenneth Thompson ed. 1980);
Olusola Ojo Ahmadu Sessay, The OAUand Human Rights: Prospects for the 1980s and Beyond, 8
HUM. RTs. Q. 89 (1994).
2 Most African constitutions contained, either in their preambles and/or substantive provisions,
measures for the promotion and protection of human rights. See ALG. CONST. ch. IV (1976); La
Loi Fondamentale, Benin, Aug. 26, 1977, Afrique Contemporaire, 93 Sept.-Oct. at 23 (1977), et
seq., preamble and ch. VIII; ETH. CONST. ch. III, (revised 1955); GHANA CONST. pmbl. and
ch.4 (1969); GUINEA CONST. pmbl. & pt. X (1958); KENYA CONST. ch. V (1969);
MAURITIUS CONST. ch. 11 (1968); MOROCCO CONST. pmbl. & art.8-12 (dealing with the
political rights of the citizen) & art. 13-18 (dealing with the economic and social rights of the
citizen) (1962); NIG. CONST. ch. III (1963); NIG. CONST. ch. IV (1979 & 1999); SEN. CONST.
pmbl. & pt. II (1963); TANZ. CONST. (Interim) pmbl. (July 1965); ZAMBIA CONST. pt. III
(1973); CONGO CONST. (1969); see also CONGO CONST. pt. II, (1973); Georges Lavroff, La
Constitution De La Republique Populaire du Congo du 12 Juillet 1973, 1 REVUE JURIDIQUE ET
POLITIQUE, 3-4 (1974) (for the text of the Constitution of 1973 see 1 REVUE JURIDIQUE ET
POLITIQUE, 15-26, (1974)); ZAIRE CONST. pmbl. & title 1I (amended July 1976); see also
GHANA CONST. ch.6 (1979); ZIMB. CONST. ORDER ch. III (1979).
3 Gino J. Naldi, Supreme Court of Zimbabwe declares Judicial Corporal Punishment on Juveniles
unconstitutional, 2 REVUE AFRICAINE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET COMPAR (RADIC) 488-492
(1990); Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, The Judiciary and the Legal Protection of Human Rights in
Common Law Africa: Allocating Responsibility for the failure of Post-Independence Bills of Rights,
8 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L., (ASIL Proc.) 124-137 (1996); J.K Minkah-Premo,
The Role of Judicial Enforcement of ECOSOC Rights in National Development: The Case of Ghana,
11 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L., (ASIL Proc.) 52-89 (1999).
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to African countries.4 For the present purpose, this article will focus on
the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights,5 which is the main
human rights instrument that is applicable to all of Africa.
First, some preliminary issues need to be addressed. Africa has
never been short of human rights laws. Since the early independence
days in the 1960s, the constitutions of virtually all African countries
displayed elaborate human rights provisions generally referred to as bill
of rights. Credit for this goes to the erstwhile colonial masters. Although
they had given little or no regard to the human rights of Africans under
colonial rule,6 they often left behind elaborate human rights laws and
administrative institutions. Unfortunately, however, soon after the
foreign overlords departed, their African successors began to jettison the
inherited structures. In places such as Nigeria, where the human rights
laws were retained in the postcolonial constitutions, these laws were of
little effect in improving the welfare of the great majority of the people.
The great majority of Africa's postcolonial leaders, under the guise of
searching for an indigenous system of political organization, opted for
heavy-handed rule paying little or no attention to human rights. In order
to shield their misrule from international observers, the leaders claimed
unfettered sovereignty over matters of human rights, which they regarded
as domestic affairs. Regimes such as those of Jean-Bedel Bokassa in
Central Africa, Idi Amin in Uganda, and Fernando Macias Nguema in
the Republic of Equatorial Guinea demonstrated the depths of state
brutality. In most African countries, human rights were replaced with
human suffering as the rulers, one after another, imposed one-party rule,
suppressed political dissent and personalized the resources of the state.
The continent became a breeding ground for despots like Mobutu Sese
Seko, Mengistu, and others. The idea of human rights never gained
popularity with these despots. Their palpable misrule gave rise to brutal
civil wars and humanitarian catastrophes in Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria
(1967-1970), Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola and Democratic Republic of
Congo (formerly Zaire).
The cold war did not help matters. As is often said, (in Africa)
"when two elephants fight, the grass suffers." This saying depicts the
effect of the East-West power struggle of the cold war era on African
societies. Turned into a major geopolitical battleground for the two super
powers, the continent became a dumping ground for deadly arms and
ammunitions. Several years after the cold war, the arms have continued
4 For a table showing the state of ratification of international human rights treaties by African
countries, see Frans Vijoen, The Six Major United Nations Human Rights Treaties and Monitoring
Mechanisms: Their Relevance For Africa, 11 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L., (ASIL
Proc.) 132-133 (1999).
5 A full text is available in 21 I.L.M. 59.
6 CLAUDE AKE, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA, 3 (The Brookings Inst. 1996).
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to be used with tragic consequences. Starting with Congo in 1960, the
super powers tried to influence the ideological orientation of African
governments. One of the rewards given to friendly governments was that
the superpowers would turn a blind eye toward their human rights
violations, no matter how serious. Another reward was that they would
stabilize and subsidize governmental authority even if it was corrupt and
oppressive .
Then came the tragic wave of military intervention in
government, which ravaged the continent, like bush fire in the harmattan.
Within the first twenty years of independence, virtually all African
countries had experienced some form of military insurrection. Needless
to say that these had devastating effects on human rights and the rule of
law.8
Amidst all these problems the Organization of African Unity was
powerless to alleviate the suffering of the Africans. Formed in 1963, at a
time when the newly independent states of the continent feared clashes
over their arbitrary, colonially defined borders and neocolonialist
meddling from their recently estranged colonial overlords, the
organization adopted a conservative outlook aimed at preserving the
existing order while defending the colonial borders. Consequently, it
could not mediate effectively in African conflicts nor could it provide
any meaningful protection for the human rights of Africans. 9
I. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
Although it has been castigated as a "meaningless document" 10
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights remains the first
major attempt by African leaders to establish a regional machinery for
the implementation of the rights of Africans.1 Adopted on June 17, 1981
by the eighteenth Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the
Charter reaffirms the support of African leaders for international
protection of human rights and freedom, as declared in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Having thus given consent to the
7 Nana K.A. Busia, The New World Order and Its Implications for Human Rights and Democracy in
Africa- A Cortical Appraisal, 11 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L., (ASIL Proc.) 133-
152 (1993).
8 GEORGE AYITTEH, AFRICA IN CHAOS (1998).
9 Christopher Mulei, The Role of the OAUin the Democratization Process- A Case of Lack of Clear-
Cut Policies and Political will Towards an Open Society, 6 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF
INT'L L., (ASIL Proc.) 56-72 (1994).
10 Makay Wa Mutawa, The African Human Rights System in a Comparative Perspective, 3 REVUE
AFRICAINE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 6 (1993).
11 For a balanced assessment of the Charter, see R. M. D'sa, Human and Peoples' Rights:
Distinctive Features of the African Charter, I J. AFR. L. 29, 74 (1985).
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internationalization of human rights, the African leaders could no longer
plead that human rights were matters reserved exclusively for the
domestic jurisdiction. Therefore, the fagade of 'national sovereignty'
would no longer provide a cover up for grave breaches of human rights.
Although many critics of the African Charter often underestimate the
significance of this development, it is one of the most important
achievements of the adoption of the Charter. While it is ironic that a
group of despotic rulers would establish such machinery for the
implementation of human rights, the historical and political significance
of their action must not be underestimated.
Just like its predecessors, (The European Convention on Human
Rights and the Inter American Convention on Human Rights), the
African Charter provides for a number of civil and political rights
traditionally referred to as "first generation rights., 12 These include, the
right to freedom from discrimination (art. 2), equality before the law,
equal protection of the law (art. 3), inviolability of the human person and
respect for human life, integrity and legal status including prohibition of
slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment
(art. 4 & 5), right to fair hearing including an effective appeal to
competent national organs, presumption of innocence, right to counsel of
one's choice and trial within a reasonable time and prohibition of
retroactive laws (art. 6 & 7). The Charter further guarantees the freedom
of conscience and religion (art. 8), right to receive information, express
and disseminate opinions (art. 9), freedom of association and the right to
assemble freely with others (art. 10 & 11), right of entry and residence of
aliens (art. 12), right of participation in government (art. 13) and the right
to property (art. 14). These rights are however subject to "clawback"
clauses or restrictions of law and order, national security, the safety,
health, ethics and the rights and freedoms of others.1 3 The Charter avoids
the use of general derogation clauses.1 4 Yet it permits the imposition by
domestic law of a wide range of limitations. However, in view of the
obligations of member states under the Charter and general international
law, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter
limits the liberty of any state to enact laws imposing restrictions on its
guaranteed rights.
12 Traced to the natural rights philosophy of the late 18th Century, these rights have traditionally
been given priority by western states. See D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 601 (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. 1979).
13 See supra note 11.
14 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art.4, 14668 U.N.T.S. 171.;
European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 15, 213 U.N.TS. 221, E.T.S. 5.; American
Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, art.27, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. The general derogation
clauses in these three instruments are similar.
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The second broad category of rights guaranteed by the African
Charter consists of economic, social and cultural rights now widely
referred to as "second generation rights." These rights attained
recognition in the twentieth century with the advent of socialism.
Although there is jurisprudential debate and skepticism on the part of
some western states as to the human rights character of "second
generation" human rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
catalogues rights within both generations as human rights. Furthermore,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights impose
legal obligations in respect of each. Moreover, the premise underlying all
United Nations human rights texts is that civil and political, as well as
economic, social and cultural rights are of equal priority, revealing that
the two groups of rights are interdependent. This approach has been
adopted by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' rights, which
makes provisions for both categories of rights without giving priority to
either group.
The African Charter provides that every person shall have the
right to work under equitable and satisfactory conditions and shall
receive equal pay for equal work. (art. 15) The view has been correctly
expressed that if the right to work is intended as imposing a legal duty on
states to provide employment, then it is difficult to see how this can be
translated into a concrete right capable of enforcement in Africa.15 The
stark reality in Africa today appears to be the direct opposite of what the
Charter seeks to guarantee. The right to work is virtually non-existent
and the majority of the people who seem to be enjoying this right are
working under harsh conditions almost akin to servitude. Workers
retrenchment, non-payment of salaries, job insecurity and the like are
common features of African labor markets.
Other rights provided include the rights to enjoy the best
attainable state of physical and mental health (art. 16(1)). This imposes
an obligation on the state parties to take necessary measures to protect
the health of the people and to ensure that they receive medical attention
when they are sick (art. 16(2)). There is also the right to education, and
the right of every person to take part in the cultural life of his country,
while a duty is imposed on the state to promote and protect the morals
and traditional values recognized by a community (art. 17(3)).
The Charter recognizes the family as the natural unit and basis of
society, which shall be protected and assisted by the state. The state is
15 EZE, supra note 1, at 226. But see AMECHI UCHEGBU, ECONOMIC RIGHTS, THE AFRICAN
CHARTER ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 161-187 (J.A. Omotola and A.A. Adeogun eds., University Press
1987) (Professor Amechi Uchegbu, maintains that where a neo-colonial state sheds its responsibility
towards its citizens by collaborating with the rich minority to deny the people the right to work and
to earn decent wages, the government ceases to be legitimate.)
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obligated to ensure the elimination of every form of discrimination
against women and also to ensure the protection of the rights of women
and children as stipulated in international instruments and conventions.
Special measures are to be taken for the protection of the aged and the
disabled in keeping with their moral and physical condition (art. 18).
The guarantee of these rights by the African Charter and other
human rights instruments do not automatically make them available to
the majority of the African peoples because the facilities required for
their enjoyment are largely non-existent in the continent. Also, the
political economy is under the grip of a minority elite who are out to
preserve their privileged position, which in fact conditions the manner in
which available resources are allocated and utilized. Many African
leaders spend huge sums of money on white elephant projects such as
construction of their official or personal mansions, churches and
mosques while maintaining that they lack resources for implementing
basic educational and health programs required to improve the living
standards of the overwhelming majority of their people. The majority is
invariably deprived of the basic necessities of life, while the ruling elite
and their friends swim in oceans of opulence. Subsistence living
becomes the order of the day, the right to property is rendered illusory as
most people have no property worthy of protection, and the right to work
is nothing but a mere theoretical guarantee hardly worth the paper on
which it is written.
One of the unique features of the African Charter is its
recognition and enunciation of group rights described as "people's rights
and freedoms." Traditionally referred to as third generation rights, these
rights began to take a distinctive form as recently as the 1970s and their
chief proponents are the developing states. 6 The inclusion of the rights
of peoples in the Charter reflects the importance of the group or
community under African customary law.17
The Charter guarantees non-domination of people (by another)
as all peoples shall be equal and shall enjoy the same respects and rights
(art. 19). The right of all peoples to existence and self-determination
guaranteed by the Charter encompasses the freedom of people to
determine their political status and to ensure their economic and social
development according to the policy they have freely chosen (art. 20(1)).
Colonized and oppressed peoples shall not only have the right to free
themselves by resorting to any means recognized by the international
community, but they shall also have the right to the assistance of the state
16 See Harris, supra note 12 at 601
17 Makau wa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the
Language of Duties, 6 REVUE AFRICAINE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 16 (1996-7); 35 VA. J. INT'L L.
339 (1995).
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parties in liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political,
economic or cultural (art. 2 (2) and (3)).
Moreover, the principle of sovereignty over natural resources is
recognized. All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural
resources in a manner, which is in their exclusive interest, and in no case
shall a people be deprived of it. In case of expropriation, the dispossessed
people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of property as well as
to adequate compensation. However, the free disposal of wealth and
natural resources shall be exercised without prejudice to the obligation of
promoting an international economic co-operation on the basis of mutual
respect, equitable exchange and the principle of international law.
The right to development is guaranteed. Thus, all peoples shall
have the right to their economic, social and cultural development in strict
respect of their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the
common heritage of mankind (art. 22(1)). Recognizing that development
is not possible in the absence of peace, the Charter further provides for
the right of all peoples to national and international peace and security,
while reaffirming the principles of solidarity and friendly relations
between states contained in the Charter of the United Nations and the
Organization of African Unity. Finally, the right of the peoples to a
general satisfactory environment favorable to their development is
guaranteed.
In addition to these rights, the Charter contains corresponding
duties which state parties to the convention are expected to perform
towards the attainment of the objectives of the Charter. Thus, state
parties shall individually and collectively exercise the right to free
disposal of their wealth and natural resources with a view to
strengthening African unity and solidarity (art. 21(4)). They shall also
eliminate all forms of economic exploitation, particularly that practiced
by international monopolies so as to enable their peoples to fully benefit
from the advantages derived from their natural resources (art. 2(5)).
Third, states shall also have the duty, separately or in co-operation with
others, to ensure the exercise of the right to development. Finally, states
shall not allow their territories to be used as bases for subversive or
terrorist activities against the people of any other state party to the
Charter.
II. The African Commission
The sole organ for the implementation of the African Charter is
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. Established in
1987, the Commission consists of eleven members known as
Commissioners who are elected by the OAU through secret ballot for a
six-year term and serve in their personal capacities." The members are
18 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 15, at art. 31, art. 33, art. 36, art. 42.
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elected by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU;
the members in turn elect the Chairman and Vice Chairman. The
Secretary-General of the OAU appoints the Secretary of the
Commission.
The members are independent in the exercise of their functions
as Commissioners. They must be Africans of the highest reputation
known for their high morality, integrity, impartiality and competence in
matters of human and peoples' rights, particular consideration is given to
persons having legal experience. The headquarters of the Commission is
located in Banjul, Gambia, pursuant to a decision of the twenty-fourth
session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU.
The Commission conducts two regular sessions annually, each lasting a
maximum of 15 days. Isaac Nguema, a former Chairman of the
Commission, considers these annual sessions insufficient in light of the
functions the Commission has to perform.19
The principal function of the African Commission is to ensure
the promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights. The
promotional mission is discharged through such programs as study,
research, information, sensitization, consciousness-raising, education and
leadership training in the field of human rights. The promotion function
of the Commission extends to cooperation with both governmental and
non-governmental organizations in the field of human rights. Further, the
Commission's protection functions include the examining of complaints
of human rights violations alleged either by the State parties or by private
persons. 20 It also performs quasi-legislative functions such as
interpretation of the Charter and elaboration of drafts of legislative or
regulatory texts to be proposed to States in the area of human rights (art.
45). Under Articles 60 and 61 of the Charter, the Commission is
authorized to make use of international and comparative human rights
law and other principles of law in the interpretation and implementation
of Charter provisions.
There are some who would condemn the African Commission
for failing to take serious actions when dealing with grave human rights
violations across Africa. However, in a number of cases, the Commission
19 Isaac Nguema, Africa, Human Rights and Development, REVUE AFRICAINE DES DROITS DE
L'HOMME 91, 112 (1998).
20 In its second session, Dakar, 8-14 Feb. 1988, the Commission adopted its internal regulations
governing the procedure for the examination of complaints. With respect to duties, it has been
suggested that the Commission should clarify which of the duties in the Charter are moral or legal
obligations and what the scope of their application ought to be. Makau wa Mutua, supra note 16, at
45. See Onje Gye-Wado, A Comparative analysis of the Institutional Framework for the
Enforcement of Human Rights in Africa and Western Europe, 2 REVUE AFRICAINE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL ET COMPARE (RADIC) 187 (1990).
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has intervened to protect human and peoples' rights. The case of Nigeria
under military dictatorship provides an illustration of the proactive role
of the African Commission in dealing with serious human right
violations. At first, the Commission adopted a diplomatic approach and
merely criticized the military regime through Resolutions passed at its
ordinary sessions. For instance, in the resolution on Nigeria adopted on
November 3, 1994 at the 16 th Ordinary Session of the Commission held
from October 25 through November 3, 1994 in Banjul, Gambia. The
resolution among other things regretted the annulment of the June 12,
1993 Presidential election in Nigeria, though it had been adjudged free
and fair by national and international observers. The commission
condemned the gross violation of human rights in Nigeria as evidenced
by:
The exclusion of the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights from the operation of decrees adopted by the military
regime;
The detention of pro-democracy activists and members of the press;
The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the courts over decrees;
The discarding of court judgments;
The promulgation of laws without proper procedure or penal laws
with retroactive effect; and
The closure of newspaper houses.
The resolution further called upon the Nigerian Government to
respect the right of free participation in government and the right to
self-determination and hand over power to the duly elected
representatives of the people without unnecessary delay.
The Commission, during its 2 nd Extraordinary Session in
Kampala, Uganda, from December 18-19, 1995, condemned the human
rights abuses of the Nigerian Military regime of General Abacha, and
requested that the government prevent harm to the Ogoni detainees. The
Commission resolved to send a delegation to Nigeria to discuss the
situation with Nigerian Government officials. 21  Unfortunately,
notwithstanding the efforts of the Commission and other human rights
bodies, the military government went ahead with the trial and execution
of the Ogoni leaders including Ken Saro Wiwa.
The grave situation in Burundi and Rwanda was also addressed
by the Commission at its 2ud Extraordinary Session. It decried the use of
armed bandits to cause insecurity, assassinations and massive
displacement of civilian populations. Yet it was powerless to stop the
1994 genocide in Rwanda and to prevent blood-letting in Burundi.22
21 Final Communique of the 2nd Extraordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, Dec. 18-19, 1995, Kampala, Uganda.
22 Abdelsalam A. Radwan Mohammed, Article 58 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, 8 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L., (ASIL Proc.) 290, 303-305 (1996).
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The weakness of the Commission concerns its lack of freedom of
action under Charter provisions. For instance after duly noticing a case of
emergency or a situation of "serious or massive" violations of human or
peoples' rights, it shall notify the chairman of the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government "who may request an in-depth study." Poor
funding, understaffing and reliance on the OAU for implementation of its
sessions are additional problems limiting the effectiveness of the African
Commission. However, there is optimism that the establishment of an
African Court under the regime of a dynamic African Union would bring
about greater effectiveness of the African human rights system.
III. The Impact of the African Charter on the Domestic Laws
of African Countries
Notwithstanding its defects (and they are many), the African
Charter and the African Commission have had some important beneficial
effects on the domestic law and practice relating to human and peoples'
rights in several African countries.
First, the Charter has positively impacted (albeit indirectly) the
development of constitutional law with particular reference to human
rights. The last decade has witnessed the adoption of new constitutions
that incorporate bill of rights in a manner similar to those contained in
the African Charter. The South African Bill of Rights, for instance,
guarantees socio-economic rights such as the right to education.
Similarly, Malawi and Namibia have adopted new constitutional pacts
which show a commitment to the recognition and protection of human
rights as enunciated in the African Charter and other international human
rights instruments. These new bills of human rights differ from those of
the immediate post colonial era in that, not only are they justiciable, but
they also reflect changed political realities and on-going democratic
struggles. As Maluwa observed, "The common theme running through
all these changes has been the attempt to institute political pluralism and
democratic rule in place of single-party dictatorships and autocratic
oligarchies that had become the political order of the day in all but a
handful of African states, and to build a political culture founded on a
conception of human rights now taken for granted in the more
established democracies. 23
Also, some African countries have incorporated the Charter into
domestic law, thus facilitating its enforcement by domestic courts. In
Nigeria for instance, the Charter was incorporated through the African
Charter (Ratification and Enforcement) Act cap 10, Laws of the
Federation of Nigeria, 1990. Consequently, Nigerian lawyers frequently
cite the provisions of the Charter to support human rights actions in
23 Tiyanjana Maluwa, Discourses on Democracy and Human Rights in Africa, 9 REVUE AFRICAINE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET COMPARE (RADIC) 55, 57 (1997).
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domestic courts. In the case of Abacha v. Fawehinmi,24 the Nigerian
Supreme Court upheld a decision of the Court of Appeals on the
superiority of the African Charter to domestic legislation. The Court,
however, rejected an argument that the Charter was superior to the
national constitution of the country.
25
The African Charter has also had some positive political impact
in African countries. Nigeria has a good record of compliance with
decisions of the African Commission. The few cases of non-compliance
are exceptional. In fact, African countries often respond with less
enthusiasm toward United Nations human rights mechanisms. They
regard the African human rights system as "our own" while often
viewing the United Nations system as foreign. It is believed that the
Nigerian military government might have executed some Zango Kataf
activists who were sentenced to death by a tribunal, but for the
intervention of the African Commission. The Chairman of the
Commission had written to the Nigerian Government urging it to
postpone the planned execution of the activists pending the
determination of their petition by the Commission. The government
seems to have complied.
Again in Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire,26 although the
Commission did not accept the claim of the people of Katanga to 'self-
determination in a manner that would have recognized their claim to
secede from Zaire, the government was held to be under an obligation to
recognize the peoples' right to their indigenous culture and language.
Perhaps the most profound impact of the African human rights
system on domestic law has been in the area of civil society
empowerment. Before the establishment of the African Commission,
African human rights NGOs used to work only with NGOs based in
Europe and America. There was little interaction among African NGOs.
However, the Charter, in its establishment of the Commission, has
created a platform for NGOs to meet twice every year to exchange ideas.
African NGOs with observer status at the African Commission are
allowed to make submissions at the sessions of the Commission. During
the military era, Nigerian NGOs learned a lot from South African NGOs
through this platform. The African NGOs now have what is called the
Civil Society Forum at the Summit of the Heads of State of OAU (now
African Union). It is the work of the NGOs (African and non-African)
that gave impetus to the emergence of the additional protocols of the
African Charter including that of the African Court. The NGOs forum
constituted a powerful lobbying group in convincing African leaders
24 Abacha v. Fawehinmi, Part 4 F.W.L.R. 533 (2000).
25 Ogugu v. State, 4 N.W.L.R. 1 (1994).
26 Eighth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission of Human and Peoples' Rights, June
26-28, 1995, Parts 1 & 2, at 187-188.
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about the need, not only for an African Court but also for an African
Union. The following section considers these new features of the African
human rights system.
IV. The African Court
In 1998, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State finally adopted
the Protocol establishing an African Court on Human and Peoples'
Rights (hereinafter the 'African Court'). The Court is designed to
complement the protective mandate of the African Commission.2 7 Its
jurisdiction extends to all cases and disputes concerning the
interpretation and application of the Charter, the Protocol, and any
relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the states concerned.28
At the request of a member state of the OAU, any of its organs
or any African Organization recognized by the OAU, the Court is
entitled to give advisory opinions on any legal matter relating to the
Charter on any other relevant human rights instruments. 29 Direct access
to the Court is granted to the African Commission, state parties and
African inter-governmental organizations. 30 Others, such as NGOs with
observer status and individuals, are also entitled to institute cases directly
before the Court in urgent matters or serious, systematic or massive
violations of human rights provided that the Court shall not accept any
27 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 2, 9 REVUE AFRICAINE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL ET COMPARE (RADIC) 432-439 (1997). See also E.K. Quashigah, The African
Court of Human Rights: Prospects, in Comparison with the European Court and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, 10 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L., (ASIL Proc.) 59-60
(1998). Gino J. Naldi and Konstantinos Magliveras, The Proposed African Court of Human and
Peoples' Rights: Evaluation and Comparison, 8 REVUE AFRICAINE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET
COMPARE (RADIC) 944, 944-969 (1996).
28 Protocol to the Afican Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 27, at art. 3(1). Further, the Protocol, in Article 7, identifies the "sources
of law" as "the provisions of the charter and any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by
the states concerned."
For a history of the African Court, See Ben Kioko, The Road to the African Court on Human and
Peoples'Rights, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L., (ASIL Proc.) 70-85 (1998). The 34th
Ordinary Session of the Assembly held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso from June 8-10, 1998
endorsed the recommendation of the Council of Ministers approving the Protocol on the
establishment of the African Court.
29 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 27, at Art. 4(1).
30 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 27, at art. 5(1).
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petition from NGOs or individuals involving a state party that has not
made a declaration accepting the competence of the Court under Article
6(3) and (5). The need to grant direct access to NGOs and individuals
was informed by the reluctance of African States to file complaints
against each other. Since the inauguration in 1987 of the African
Commission, no member state had ever filed a complaint against
another.31 The Court shall rule on admissibility of cases instituted by
NGOs and individuals in accordance with the provisions of Article 56 of
the Charter.32 In accordance with the philosophy of the African Charter,
the Court may reach an amicable settlement in a case pending before it.33
The Eleven judges of the Court shall be nationals of Member
States of the OAU and there shall be adequate gender representation in
the nomination process.
34 The quorum shall be at least seven judges.
35
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall elect the Judges
by secret ballot. The Assembly shall ensure that there is representation of
the main regions of Africa and their principal legal traditions.36 This is an
improvement to the African Charter, which contains no provision for
geographical or gender representation.
Judges of the court are to be elected for a term of six (6) years
and may be re-elected only once. The judges, except the President shall
perform their functions on a part-time basis. The court shall elect its
President and one Vice-President for a period of two years. They may be
re-elected only once.37  Provisions are made to guarantee the
independence and immunity of the judges in accordance with
international law. The position of judge is declared by Article 18 to be
incompatible with any activity that might interfere with the independence
or impartiality of such judge or the demands of the office.
31 Ben Kioko, supra note 28, at 82.
32 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 27, at art. 6(2).
33 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 27, at art. 9.
34 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 27, at art. 11 & 12.
35 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 27, at art. 23.
36 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 27, at art. 14.
37 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 27, at art. 21.
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The Court shall make its decisions on the basis of written or oral
evidence including expert testimony.38 It may make appropriate orders
including payment of fair compensation or reparation. It shall adopt such
provisional measures as may be necessary in cases of extreme gravity
39and urgency in order to avoid irreparable harm to persons.
The Court shall render its opinion within ninety (90) days of
completing its deliberations. A decision is not subject to appeal.40
Unlike the African Commission, the African Court is endowed with
power to give final and binding judgments. 41 This capability, coupled
with the right of access to the court granted NGOs and individual will
greatly enhance the effectiveness of the African human rights
mechanism. 42 As a judicial body, the Court does its work openly. It is
therefore more likely to attract media attention and generate more
interest, while also raising the level of awareness about the African
human rights system. This is preferable to the position of the African
Commission, which could hold only private sessions.
The protection that would be available through the Court would
place Africans, individuals and NGOs alike, in a better position to defend
democratic rule in their countries. In this way the Court possesses the
potential to strengthen the rule of law and help consolidate African
democracies.43
Moreover, the Court shall notify the parties of its judgment and
transmit copies thereof to the Member States of the OAU, the Council of
Ministers and the Commission. It is the responsibility of the Council of
Ministers to monitor the execution of the judgment of the Court on
behalf of the Assembly.44 States parties undertake to comply with the
judgment in any case to which they are parties within the time stipulated
38 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 27, at art. 26.
39 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 27, at art. 27.
40 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 27, at art. 28.
41 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 27, at art 28 (2). Since the African Commission is not a judicial body,
lawyers could not argue before it. It is thus deprived of the assistance, which lawyers appearing
before it could render in dealing with the numerous cases before it.
42 Franz Viljoen, Arguments in Favor Of and Against an African Court on Human Rights, 22
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L., (ASIL Proc.) 10 (1998).
43 Id.
44 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 27, at art.29.
2001-2002 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: NEW TRENDS 173
by the Court and also undertake to guarantee a judgment's execution.45
The Court shall submit to each regular session of the Assembly, a report
on its work during the previous year. The contents of the report shall
include cases of non-compliance with the court's judgment by any state.
Though the budget of the Court shall be funded by the OAU,46 the Court
shall draw up its own rules and determine its own procedures.47
The Protocol of the African Court supplies the missing link in
the African human rights mechanism. By so doing, it complies with the
standard already set by other regional mechanisms, namely the European
Convention and the Inter-American System, which provide effective
judicial forum for enforcing human rights. It is hoped that the African
Court, in developing authentic human rights jurisprudence, would follow
the proactive approach of the European and Inter-American Human
Rights Courts. However, the view has been expressed that the Inter-
American System is of much more relevance to the African situation.48
V. The African Union and Human Rights
At the conclusion of the two-day (March 1-2, 2001)
extraordinary meeting of the Organization of African Unity held in Sirte,
Libya, all member states of the Organization of African Unity
unanimously decided to establish a pan-African organization as a way of
creating closer relations among the different countries. Modeled on the
European Union, the Organization, named the African Union is aimed at
restoring dignity and economic strength after decades of economic
backwardness and political instability. It replaced the Organization of
African Unity, which had proved to be incapable of delivering the
promise of a genuine African integration, common currency, foreign
policy, defense structure and common economic programs as initially
envisaged by the Pan African Movement of the 1950s.
All 53 OAU members have signed the declaration of the Union,
but thirty-six ratifications are required for it to take effect.49 When the
Union eventually takes off, it is expected to have an Assembly of Heads
of State, an Executive Council of Ministers, a parliament and a court of
45 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 27, at art. 30.
46 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 27, at art. 32.
47 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 27, at art. 33.
48 Franz Viljoen, The Relevance of the Inter-American Human Rights System for Africa, 1 REVUE
AFRICAINE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET COMPARt (RADIC) 661 (1999).
49 Constitutive Act of the African Union, art. 28, http://www.dfa.gov.za/for-relations/
multilateral/treaties/ auact.htm.
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justice. The Secretary-General of the OAU, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim has
opined that the African Union would make a real difference in the lives
of ordinary Africans.su On his part, Justice Kayode Eso, an eminent
Nigerian jurist and Chairman of the Banjul-based African Center for
Democracy and Human Rights Studies, says the establishment of the
African Union is "a testimony to the commitment of the Heads of State
and Government of the OAU to move Africa forward."51 But many are
skeptical that an organization promoted by Colonel Gaddafi, a leader
with questionable human rights records, is likely to place human rights
high on its agenda. 2 Only time will tell to what extent the African Union
will be able to strengthen the African human rights system. If the Union
brings about greater economic integration and closer ties among the
African States as envisaged, there should be a reduction in political
conflicts. This would in turn mean a better life for the war torn areas in
the region. Further, a better economic performance that the Union is
expected to bring about should mean an improved regime for the
implementation of socio-economic rights in the African continent.
5 3
Conclusion
We have attempted to review the existing regime for the
protection of human and peoples' rights in Africa. While the African
Commission may not have done much to implement the human and
peoples' rights in the African Charter, it has initiated some important
moves in the direction of fulfilling its mandate. These include the
creation of greater awareness about the African Charter and the
establishing of a platform for co-operation and networking among
African human rights NGOs. By its inability to enforce the provisions of
the Charter, the Commission has underscored the necessity for a judicial
forum capable of making authoritative and final pronouncements in cases
50 BBC NEWS, African Union treaty comes into force (May 26, 2001), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/ world/africa/newsid-l 352000/1 352707.stm,
51 Kayode Eso, The Role of the African Human Rights System and Civil Society in the African
Union 3 (Mar. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Kayode Eso Library, Ibadan,
Nigeria).
52 The objectives of the African Union, as stated in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act, include the
following: a. Achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of
Africa; b. Defend the sovereignty, tenitorial integrity, and independence of its Member States; c.
Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; d. Encourage international
cooperation taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights; f. Promote and protect human and peoples' rights and other relevant human rights
instruments. Supra note 49, at art. 3.
53 N.J. Udombana, Towards the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights: Better late than
never, 8 REVUE AFRICAINE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 338-58 (1999).
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of human rights violations. It is significant that although an adjudicatory
forum has now been added to the African human rights system, the
reconciliatory approach has not lost its appeal to the African leaders,
who, notwithstanding the provision for a court, still provided for
amicable settlement in Article 7 of the African Court's Protocol. It is also
significant that access to the Court has been granted to individuals and
NGOs in urgent cases or serious, systematic or massive violations of
human rights. Fortunately, the Court has the rich experience of the
African Commission as well as that of the other regional courts
elsewhere to draw from. However, it may have to contend with the
problems of inadequate funding14 and other constraints such as the
possibility of hostility from African governments with poor human rights
records. The international community and others who are genuinely
interested in advancing the cause of human rights in Africa must support
the Court with such a level of funding"5 to ensure its financial
independence. On its part, the African Union should be expected to
create an enabling environment for the Court by tackling the problems of
political instability, bad governance, massive poverty, widespread
illiteracy and other impediments to the realization of human rights in
Africa.
54 Christof Heyns, The Regional and Sub-Regional Protection of Human Rights in Africa: In Search
of a Realistic Dream, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L., (ASIL Proc.) 8 (1996).
55 Inger Osterdahl, The Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae of the African Court of Human and Peoples'
Rights: A Comparative Critique, 7 REVUE AFRICAINE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 132-150 (1998).
The writer opines that the establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights is a
great success for the Organization of African Unity (OAU). This also marks a great step forward in
the struggle for human rights in Africa. All efforts to strengthen human right in Africa must be
encouraged.
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The Implementation of ECOWAS' New Protocol and Security




In October 1999, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1270
concerning the armed conflict in Sierra Leone shortly before the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a new
protocol in November 1999. The implementation of this Resolution by the
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), first, side by side,
and later, in conjunction with the ECOWAS Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) proved to be a telling moment in the history of joint
peacekeeping operations between the United Nations and regional
organizations. Three key ECOMOG contingents-Nigeria, Ghana, and
Guinea-withdrew from Sierra Leone as a result of a deepening crisis
between the leaderships of ECOWAS, dominated by Nigerians, and
UNAMSIL, substantially composed of Indians. A later effort by the U.N.
to fashion a cohesive mission under a unified command only brought
more woes. The leadership of UNAMSIL under Major-General Vijay
Jetley collapsed, leading to the withdrawal of the 3,000 strong Indian
contingent from Sierra Leone. The purpose of this article is to examine
Resolution 1270 and the new ECOWAS protocol, analyze the
relationship between UNAMSIL and ECOWAS, and then consider the
impact of ECO WAS' new protocol on the law ofpeacekeeping.
Introduction
The years 1990-2000 constituted a moment of truth for the
hitherto little known sub regional organization, the Economic
Community of West African States (hereinafter ECOWAS).1 From being
*(LLB) Lagos, (LLM) Cantab, PhD Candidate and Teaching Assistant in international law,
University of Nottingham. This article is a sequel to my commentary on the new ECOWAS
protocol, The New Collective Security Mechanism of ECOWAS: Innovations and Problems, 5(2) J.
CONFLICT & SECURITY L., 211-229 (2000). Most of the ECOWAS materials referred to in this
article are on file with the author. They were obtained directly from ECOWAS headquarters in
Abuja, Nigeria in 2000 while the author interned With the legal department. The writer also attended
one of the many summits of ECOWAS heads of States and governments during this period, and
conducted several interviews with the Directors and the Deputy Directors of the Department of
Legal Affairs of ECOWAS. Except when referring to such interviews specifically, this article does
not represent the view of the ECOWAS legal department. Lastly, I am indebted to Professor Nigel
White and Dr Paolo Galizzi for their comments on an early draft of this article. However, all
mistakes are entirely mine.
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an economic community at its inception in 1975, ECOWAS literally
reinvented its will in August 1990 to become, not only a collective
security organization, but also a pacesetter in the development of
regional collective security systems ingrained in the Chapter VIII of the
United Nations Charter.2
In 1993, ECOWAS became the first regional alliance to
undertake a joint 'peacekeeping' operation with the UN in the entire
history of collective security. 3 It matched this record in 1997 when it
forcefully restored a democratically elected government in Sierra Leone,
becoming the first regional organization to reinstate an overthrown
government in Africa. It could be said that the alliance closed a decade of
momentous events in its evolutionary history in December 1999 when it
adopted a new protocol (hereinafter Protocol), which not only codified
the controversial rights of humanitarian intervention and the use of force
to restore democratic governments, but also empowered it to undertake
enforcement action without the authorization of the Security Council.
4
The concurrent application of the Protocol to the Sierra Leone
conflict as the U.N. was implementing the mandate contained in its
Security Council Resolution 1270 was fraught with telling legal and
practical consequences. To wit, certain provisions of the Protocol depart
from the decentralized enforcement regime of Chapter VIII of the U.N.
Charter, which empowers regional arrangements to undertake
enforcement action only with the authorization of the Security Council.
Furthermore, the position of certain rules, widely believed to have
1 ECOWAS was formed on May 28, 1975, by the Treaty of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) and was amended in 1993. The Member States of ECOWAS are: The
Republics of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, the (Islamic Republic of) Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
and Togo. 35 I.L.M. 660 (1996).
2 On August 7, 1990, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee on the Liberia conflict
established the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Banjul, Republic of Gambia. See
United Nations, Security Council, Letter Dated 9 August 1990 From The Permanent Representative
Of Nigeria To The United Nations Addressed To The Secretary- General, U.N. Doc. S/21485 (1990)
(annex); REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, 6
CAMBRIDGE INT'L L. SERIES VI. 67 (Marc Weller ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994) [hereinafter M.
Weller]
3 Resolution 866 expressly states that this "would be the first peace-keeping mission undertaken by
the United Nations in cooperation with a peace-keeping mission already set up by another
organization, in this case ECOWAS." U.N. SCOR, 3281st mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES.866 (1993).
4 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peacekeeping and Security, 5 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 231 (2000)
5 U.N. CHARTER art. 53, para. 1.
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evolved into the corpus of the law of peacekeeping over time, would
appear to have become greatly undermined.6
For purpose of this article, the intervention by ECOWAS in
Sierra Leone is broadly divided into two phases. The first phase is
designated as beginning with the overthrow of the democratic
government of Tejan Kabbah and concluding with the restoration of that
government by ECOMOG forces, and the eventual withdrawal of certain
ECOMOG contingents from Sierra Leone. This article shall not be
concerned with the legal analysis of this phase except insofar as
references to it are necessary. The second phase of the intervention-the
main focal point of this effort-commences with the deployment of U.N.
peacekeepers under the aegis of UNAMSIL and the re-entry of the
Nigerian contingent into Sierra Leone. The need to make this thematic
delineation at the outset is informed by the fact that at least one legal
commentary on the first phase of the intervention already exists.
7
Moreover, the activities of ECOWAS under the first phase of its
intervention in Sierra Leone were conducted under the auspices of its old
legal regime, as represented by its Protocol on Non-Aggression' and the
Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defense (PMAD).9 Although the
specific decisions of ECOWAS concerning its actions on the Sierra
Leone conflict are contained in the numerous Final Communiqu6s issued
at the end of its myriad summits on the matter, ECOWAS substantively
complied with the provisions of the U.N. Charter and performed
obligations imposed on it by the Charter during this phase.' ° It follows
that a legal analysis of the first phase of ECOWAS' intervention under
its old regime and in accordance with the U.N. Charter was in order."
6 Although there is no direct provision of the U.N. Charter on the law of peacekeeping, it is believed
by commentators that certain features of peacekeeping operations such as consent, impartiality,
limited force, and so on, have evolved into the customary law ofpeacekeeping.
7 See generally Karsten Nowrot and Emily Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore Democracy:
International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U. INT'l L.
REV. 321 (1998).
8 Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Liberia, U.N. Doe. S/25402, at 6 (1993). The
Protocol on Non-Aggression was adopted on April 22, 1978. See M. WEllER, supra note 2, at 18.
9 Report of the Secretary- General on the Question of Liberia, supra note 8, at 6. The Protocol on
Mutual Assistance and Defence was adopted on May 29, 1981. See also 3 OFFICIAL J. EcoWAS 9
(1981); M. WELLER, supra note 2, at 19.
10 As early as July 10 1997, ECOWAS had reported to the U.N. its decision to impose sanctions on
the rebel forces in Siena Leone. Sierra Leone News Archives, (July 10, 1997), available at
http://www.sien-a-leone.org/slnews0797.html [hereinafter slnews].
11 Nowrot's and Schabacker's analysis was very comprehensive on the first phase insofar as this
analysis was an inquiry into the legality of ECOWAS' use of force to restore a democratic
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By contrast, ECOWAS conducts the second phase of its
intervention under a totally different legal regime, which, as will be
discussed below, does not conform to the provisions of, or perform the
obligations imposed by, the Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter.12 The
application of this new legal instrument demonstrably engenders
different legal consideration, and since there has not been an inquiry into
this matter, to the best of this writer's knowledge, it is appropriate to
focus more specifically on that issue.
The remaining part of this article is divided into two parts. In the
first part, I briefly recount the background to the armed conflict in Sierra
Leone. I will then examine the implementation of the mandate issued to
the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone by Resolution 1270, and
analyze the various factors that led to the breakdown in the relationship
between UNAMSIL and the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, ECOMOG.
In the second part, the article examines the effect of the Protocol on the
'law' of peacekeeping. Particular attention shall be devoted to the
following issues: (1) whether the Protocol abrogated the 'customary'
requirement of consent, and (2) whether the Protocol has caused member
states to permanently cede their right to reject or terminate an
intervention proposed by ECOWAS.
I. PART ONE
A Brief Background to the Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone 13
The armed conflict that has engulfed Sierra Leone for nearly four
years, with its accompanying brutality, was ignited on May 25, 1997,
when a group of the country's armed forces toppled the democratically
elected government of Alhaji Tejan Kabbah in a military coup d'dtat.1
4
The election of Tejan Kabbah brought to an end the 19 year one party
stronghold of Joseph Momoh after a brief military regime led by Captain
Valentine Strasser, who himself was ousted in yet another coup by his
deputy, Julius Maada Bio.1 It then fell to the latter head of junta to
transfer the reins of government in Sierra Leone to a democratically
government, a casu foederis that was neither included in its old legal regime or expressly permitted
by the U.N. Charter.
12 See Ademola Abass, supra note 4.
13 For a legal-historical explanation of Sierra Leone from the 15th century to the period before the
conflict, see the article that follows.-Eds.
14 James Rupert, Civilian Rule Overturned in Sierra Leone: Soldiers Seize Power, Loot W. African
Capital, WASH. POST, May 26, 1997, at A21. See the condemnation of the coup by the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Andrew Meldrum, Annan and OAU Leaders Endorse
Intervention against "'Usurpers", GUARDIAN (London), June 3, 1997, at 14.
15 Key Events in Sierra Leone's Conflict, available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/africa
/sierra-leone-chrono.html [hereinafter Key Events].
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elected government led by Kabbah.16 Upon his overthrow, President
Kabbah had fled to the neighboring Guinea from where he allegedly
invited ECOWAS to help reinstate him to the governance of Sierra
Leone. 17
On May 28, the leader of the military junta, Major Paul
Koromah abolished the constitution of Sierra Leone and installed the
Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC).1 Following a massive military
campaign inaugurated by the Nigerians-albeit ostensibly operating
under the auspices of ECOWAS-the ECOWAS Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG), in a ground-breaking episode of regional peacekeeping in
Africa, reinstated the deposed Tejan Kabbah to the governance of Sierra
Leone on March 10, 1998.19
The defeat of the coupists at this time, however, soon turned out
to be a temporary affair. The rebels loyal to Fodah Sankoh, the leader of
the rebel group known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), acting
in conjunction with the surviving 'mutineers,' 20 launched fresh attacks
against government positions. The RUF had mounted a guerrilla war
against successive military and civilian governments of Sierra Leone on
the ground that both connived with foreign countries to "milk the
country's diamond riches and impoverish its people. 21
ECOMOG troops had been stationed in Sierra Leone, under a
Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) since the days of the Liberian crisis
with the purpose of preventing a spillage of that crisis into Sierra Leone
and to curb trans-border infiltration from Liberia into Sierra Leone.22
During its twentieth session held at Abuja, Nigeria, on August 28-29,
16 See http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/missions/unomsil (last visited Oct. 27, 2001)
17 Id. However, in reality, ECOWAS had already perfected plans to intervene in the crisis even
before the supposed invitation came from the exiled president. The so-called invitation did not
emanate from Kabbah until the ECOWAS summit August 27-28, 1997, (slnews, supra note 7)
whereas ECOWAS had concluded deliberation on the actions to be taken a month earlier. Meeting of
the ECOWAS Committee of Four on Sierra Leone, Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, July 17-18, 1997
(unpublished material, on file with author).
18 Id.
19 U.N. SCOR, 3861st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES. 1156 (1998).
20 Although the events of May 25, 1997 constituted a coup d'dtat, President Tejan Kabbah had called it
a mutiny. In one of his addresses to the nation shortly after his overthrow, he instructed the members of
the Sierra Leone Army in similar terms; As your commander I hereby order you to report to the nearest
ECOMOG base without arms in your possession and declare your loyalty. By doing so you will avoid
being treated as a mutineer. See slnews, supra note 13.
21 Key Events, supra note 14.
22 Final Communique, Meeting of Chiefs of Defence Staff of Contributing States of ECOMOG in Sierra
Leone, Abuja, (April 15, 1999), para. 9(a) (on file with author).
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1997,23 the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS,
having convinced itself of the need to extend the scope of activity of
ECOMOG to Sierra Leone and to modify its mandate, approved a new
mandate for ECOMOG.24 Under the new mandate, Nigeria sent 700
troops to Sierra Leone, bringing the total number of that country's troops
in Freetown, the Sierra Leone capital city, to 1,600.
From 1997 onward, ECOWAS, which had officially affirmed
that "it is the only Force in the Sub-region capable of prompt response to
any requests in this regard [intervention] ' '2' became largely responsible
for seeking a resolution of the Sierra Leone crisis. In May 2000, Nigeria,
which has been, by far, the largest provider of both human and material
resources for ECOWAS missions in the sub-region, withdrew from
Sierra Leone.26 The rebels capitalized on what the Security Council
described as "a dangerous vacuum" created by the exit of the Nigerians
to unleash on the civilian populace of Sierra Leone, an outrageous orgy
of violence the proportions of which were widely reported to surpass any
violence in history.27 It was these circumstances that compelled the U.N.
to deploy its peacekeepers to Sierra Leone, in order to implement the
various resolutions its Security Council had adopted concerning the
conflict, and also to supervise the implementation of the Lom6 Peace
Accord already agreed to by the conflicting parties.28
B. Legal analysis of Resolution 12 70
1. The UNAMSIL Mandate in Sierra Leone
23Final Communiqu of the Summit of the Economic Community of West African States, held at Abuja
on 28 and 29 August 1997, U.N. Doc. S/1 997.695 (1997) [hereinafter Decision].
24 Id. at Art. 1.
25 Decision A/DEC.7/8/97 (1997) (on file with author).
26 BBC NEWS, Nigeria Sets Intervention Terms, (May 10, 2000), available at http://news.bbe.co.
uk/hi/english/world/africa. Not only did Nigeria provide the largest contingent to Sierra Leone, it
actually undertook to pay the salaries of the Sierra Leone contingent in ECOMOG when the Sierra
Leone government failed to pay its troops beginning in September 1996.
27 Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in
Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/1998.960, at 2-5 (1998), noting in parts that the rebel attacks were
"accompanied by a resurgence of atrocities of the nature and scale last observed during the period
from April to June, including the complete destruction of villages, and the torture, mutilation and
execution of large numbers of civilians."
28 Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front
of Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/1999.777 (1999). This Accord recalled two earlier Peace initiatives,
the Abidjan Peace Agreement of November 30, 1996 and the ECOWAS Peace Plan, October 23
1997, at http://www.Sierraleone.org/lomeaccord.html.
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The first official response by the U.N. to the Sierra Leone
conflict came in the form of Resolution 1132,29 which had, at first,
prohibited the sale and supply of arms and related materials to Sierra
Leone as a whole. 30 The coverage of this resolution was later reduced by
Resolution 1171 so that its operation targeted only the non-governmental
forces.31 Notably, Resolution 1132 was adopted both under Chapter VII
and Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter. Acting under the latter, the
resolution specifically authorized ECOWAS to ensure "strict
implementation of the provisions of this resolution relating to the supply
of petroleum and petroleum products, and arms and related materiel of
all types, including, where necessary and in conformity with applicable
international standards, by halting inward maritime shipping in order to
,132inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations....
This directive of the U.N. would seem to be superficial in light
of the fact that the resolution was in response to ECOWAS' request that
the U.N. mandate all its members to respect the sanctions ECOWAS had
already imposed on the junta.33 However, with media reports and rumors
mounting that certain member states of ECOWAS were aiding the
'mutineers', such a directive was quite necessary if the expected results
were to be achieved.34
Shortly after this embargo, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1181 which established the United Nations Observer Mission
29 U.N. SCOR, 3822d mtg., S/RES.1132 (1997).
30 Id. at2.
31 U.N. SCOR, 3889th mtg., para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES. 1171 (1998).
32 Id. at 3, para. 8. This resolution is analogous to Resolution 676 concerning the crisis in former
Yugoslavia. However, whereas the latter had been silent on the specific organisations invited to act
by the U.N., Resolution 1132 had mentioned ECOWAS specifically. It would appear that 1132
intended that ECOWAS could undertake enforcement action to achieve the stated objective.
However, such an interpretation is difficult to arrive at without taking a closer look at the wording of
the resolution. It avoided the usual euphemistic phrase 'to use all necessary means', but instead,
expressly determined the kind of action ECOWAS might take: interdiction of ships. One query that
arises is whether ECOWAS was authorized to use force to achieve this objective where a ship did
not concur with its directives.
33 Art. 2 of Decision, supra note 23, at 5, stating that "Member States shall place immediately a
general and total embargo on all supplies of petroleum products, arms and military equipment to
Sierra Leone and abstain from transacting any business with that country."
34 Although Cote d'Ivoire and Libya were prominently featured in the media reports as violating the
sanction regime, the ECOWAS Ministerial Committee of Five on Sierra Leone noted that "certain
individuals were contravening the embargo." See Communiqud, Fifth Meeting of the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, Abuja, October 10-11, 1997 (on file with
author).
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in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL).35 The Resolution mandated UNOMSIL to,
inter alia, "monitor the military and security situation in the country as a
whole...", "...and to monitor the disarmament and demobilization of
,,36fuciformer combatants.' It was to function for an initial period of six
months until January 13, 199917 but had its mandate severally extended
in the following months.38
Resolution 1181 is analogous to Resolution 866 concerning the
Liberian conflict.39 Resolution 866 established the United Nations
Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) which was mandated to perform
functions virtually similar to those entrusted upon UNOMSIL. Both
resolutions were adopted after ECOWAS had been acting in the
concerned countries. Resolution 1181 also welcomed the commitment of
ECOMOG to protect UNOMSIL personnel just as the U.N. had
requested ECOMOG to protect UNOMIL personnel in Liberia.
Therefore, the relationship between ECOWAS and the U.N. under
Resolution 1181 was that of co-operation with ECOWAS providing
military coverage for the U.N.
Following a series of violations of the terms of the ceasefire
established under the Lom& Peace Accord by the RUF, which led to fresh
hostilities between the government and RUF rebels, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 1270. This resolution affirmed that the situation in
Sierra Leone constituted a threat to international peace and security in
the region, in accordance with Article 39 of the U.N. Charter.4° This
resolution then established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNAMSIL). 41 UNAMSIL was given the mandate to "co-operate with
the government of Sierra Leone and other parties to the Peace Agreement
in the implementation of the Agreement [and] to assist in the
implementation of disarmament, monitor adherence to the ceasefire [and]
to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance" among other things.42
The initial mandate of UNAMSIL was for six months.43 The resolution
35 U.N. SCOR, 3902d mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES. 1181 (1999).
36 Id. at 2, para. 6.
37 Id.
38 U.N. SCOR, 3986th mtg., para 1., U.N. Doc. S/RES.1231 (1999); U.N. SCOR, 4012d mtg., para.
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1245 (1999).
39 Resolution 866, supra note 3, at 2.
40 U.N. SCOR, 4054th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES.1270 (1999). The first determination by the Security
Council that the situation in Sierra Leone constituted a threat to international peace and security in
the region was made in Resolution 1132; supra note 29.
41 Resolution 1270, supra note 39, at para. 8.
42 Id. at para. 8 (a),(b),(e),and (g) respectively.
43 Id. at para. 8.
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urges co-operation and co-ordination between ECOMOG and
UNAMSIL.44
Like many previous resolutions on the Sierra Leone crisis,
Resolution 1270 was adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
However, Resolution 1270 expressly approves a new mandate for
ECOMOG, which had been formulated by ECOWAS and had not been
adopted under any U.N. provision. 4' Furthermore, Resolution 1270 states
that in the discharge of its mandate, UNAMSIL may take necessary
action to ensure the security and freedom of its personnel and, within its
capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians
under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the
responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG.46
Insofar as Resolution 1270 was adopted under Chapter VII, it
presupposes that UNAMSIL mandate would be an enforcement
operation. This assertion is enhanced by a literal construction of the
wording of the mandate of that Resolution, which enjoins the
peacekeepers, not only to take necessary action to ensure the security and
freedom of its personnel, but also to afford protection to civilians under
imminent threat of physical violence. Unlike 1132 authorizing ECOWAS
action against ships, actions under 1270 clearly targeted rebel forces who
might act in any manner as to prevent UNAMSIL soldiers from
performing the task assigned to them by their mandate, or endanger their
safety.
Analytically, the wording of Resolution 1270, in the manner
stated above, is fraught with many ambiguities. In practice, the U.N.
rarely explicitly authorizes its peacekeepers to use force. Instead, it
subsumes such authorizations under liberal phrases as "all necessary
means." 47 Often, the U.N. encourages states co-operating with a troubled
state to render "all assistance necessary" to mitigate particular problem.
Nevertheless, these types of phrases are commonly construed by states
and commentators as indeed empowering U.N. troops to use force
beyond the threshold of self-defense.48
44 Id. at para. 12.
45 Decision Redefining The Mandate of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, U.N. Doe. S/1999.1073 (1999)
[hereinafter Decision 1999].
46 Resolution 1270, id. note 39, at 3, para. 14 (emphasis added).
47 See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 2963d mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES.678 (1990), which authorises Member
States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait.. .to use "all necessary means" to uphold and
implement resolution 660.
48 U.N. SCOR, 2963d mtg., U.N. Doe. S/PV.2963 (1990). In this Security Council debate leading to
the adoption of Resolution 678, the Council members variously expressed their understanding of the
phrase. Mr. Al- Ashtal, representing Yemen, argued that the statement is "in effect authorizing States
to use force", Mr. Qian Qichen of China was of the opinion that the phrase, "in essence, permits the
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Nevertheless, such mandates are usually contained in resolutions
adopted within the framework of two types of operations. The first is
where a U.N. operation is conceived as an enforcement action ab initio,
as was Resolution 678 concerning the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. The
second is where an original peacekeeping operation is being transformed
into an enforcement action, as was the case with Resolution 794
concerning Somalia. 49 The formula for signaling a change in the mandate
of a peacekeeping mission is mostly by adopting a resolution that almost
invariably empowers peacekeepers to take necessary actions for safe
delivery of humanitarian assistance or relief50 Where a U.N. mission is
conceived originally as a peacekeeping operation, and remains
essentially so despite the changing circumstances of the conflict, the
U.N. will not normally, as a matter of practice, imbue pure peacekeeping
missions with such ambivalent mandates.
Issuing a peacekeeping mission with enforcement mandates,
without a corresponding transformation of the operation into an
enforcement action, would appear to be what the U.N. did with
Resolution 1270. In providing, as it were, that UNAMSIL may, within its
capabilities and areas of deployment, afford protection to civilians,
UNAMSIL appears to have a mandate that is much wider in scope than a
usual peacekeeping one, but still short of express authorization of an
enforcement action. By contrast, during the Congo crisis, Security
Council Resolution 169 had strengthened ONUC's mandate in order to
maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of the
Republic of Congo.
Although Resolution 169, like Resolution 794, did not expressly
indicate that the U.N. mission was undergoing a metamorphosis, its real
use of military action." Mr. Abu Hassan of Malaysia noted the "force authorized by the Council."
Mr. Hurd of the U.K. also noted that according to the resolution, Member States "are authorized to
use force as may be necessary to compel compliance." The United States representative was even
more explicit: "[t]oday's resolution is very clear. The words authorize the use of force." See also
John Quigley, The United States and the United Nations in the Persian Gulf War: New Order or
Disorder? 25 CORNELL INT'L L. J., 1 (1992).
49 U.N. SCOR, 3145th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES.794 (1992). The Security Council adopted this
resolution after the failure of Security Council Resolution 732 of 1992 to make any significant
impact on the warring factions. Resolution 794 authorised the U.S. to lead a mission using "all
necessary means." It must be noted that whereas UNOSOM I had been an Observer Mission, with a
mandate to monitor a ceasefire brokered between the factions, hence a peacekeeping operation, the
U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF) established pursuant to Resolution 794 was construed as an
enforcement action. See also H. MCCOUBREY & J MORRIS, REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN THE POST
COLD WAR ERA, 130 (The Hague: Kluver Int'l. L.) (2000).
50 Resolution 794, supra note 48. The mandate was to use "all necessary means to secure
humanitarian relief."
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import was not lost on anyone. Derek Bowett observed that although
Resolution 169 did not amount to outright enforcement action, it
authorized a robust peacekeeping-a hybrid position between classical
peacekeeping and enforcement action. s' Nigel White argued, perhaps
more persuasively, that "it would be best to summarize ONUC's actions
having as their constitutional base the enforcement of provisional
measures under Article 40, but since these measures were increasingly
widely drawn so as to cope with an ever-deteriorating crisis, they
amounted to de facto enforcement action.
5 2
Thus, when Resolution 1270 read, in part, that the peacekeepers
should facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance, the impression is
created that the operation, though conceived originally as a peacekeeping
one, would, in reality, be implemented in an enforcement mode. This
indeed was ECOWAS' assumption upon the adoption of Resolution
1270.
Notwithstanding the ambiguous nature of Resolution 1270 as
revised by 1289,"3 it is clear from the explicit utterances of member
states of the U.N. that the mandate was intended to be a peacekeeping
one. During the Security Council's emergency meeting to discuss the
situation in Sierra Leone,5 4 the Secretary-General reminded the Council
that, "our mission was configured as a peacekeeping force. It was neither
designed nor equipped to be an enforcement operation.""5 He added "it
was attacked by one of the parties that pledged to cooperate with it,
before it had been properly deployed. Given that situation, we have to
consolidate and reinforce our troops so that they can defend themselves
and their mandates effectively." Notably, the Secretary-General's
statement had fallen short of requesting an authorization of enforcement
action for UNAMSIL.
The reactions of the states taking part in the meeting, to the
request by African states for a revision of the UNAMSIL mandate
referred to by the Secretary-General in his speech, is instructive on how
the mandate should be construed. The Algerian delegate to the
emergency meeting, Mr. Bali, impressed on the Council that "this test of
UNAMSIL shows very clearly that the mandate and resources available
to it are not and never were adequate to the situation.,1 6 The delegate of
the United Kingdom, Mr. Eldon, however, cautioned against
51 D. W. BOWETT, UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY, 180 (Stevens, 1964).
52 HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, THE BLUE HELMETS: LEGAL REGULATIONS OF UN
OPERATIONS, 53 (Dartmouth: 1996).
53 U.N. SCOR, 4099th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES.1289 (2000).
54 U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4139th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4139 (2000).
55 Id. at 2-3.
56 Id. at 5. The 'test' referred to here is the capture of 500 UNAMSIL personnel by the RUF forces.
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transforming UNAMSIL mandate into enforcement one. He noted that
"for the moment, UNAMSIL's mandate is sufficient for it to carry out its
tasks," and suggested that the U.N. Security Council should "be wary of
adopting an over-hasty approach," a veiled reference to Algeria's
position. 7
The position of the United Kingdom found strong support from
the Americans. Mr. Cunningham, representing the United States,
observed that United Nations peacekeepers "were organized and sent to
Sierra Leone not to impose a settlement, not to enforce the peace, but to
assist in the implementation of the Lom6 Agreement., 58 Russia followed
this line when it argued that "the mandate given UNAMSIL in Security
Council Resolution 1289 (2000) allows sufficiently strong measures to
be taken to ensure the safety of international personnel in the country and
of the Government of Sierra Leone."5 9
An official explanation of the ambiguous nature of the mandate
contained in Resolution 1270 as amended, and the raison d'6tre
underlining states' support for this mandate at the relevant time, came
from the delegates of Malaysia and Bangladesh to that meeting. In his
opinion, Mr. Hasmy contended that Malaysia supported the "limited
Chapter VII mandate then because there was an agreement on the table
and because the cooperation of the parties was assured to be
forthcoming. Clearly, many of us have been proven wrong and we will
have to recalibrate our response appropriately., 60 Mr. Chowdhury,
representing Bangladesh agreed with Malaysia, affirming that "we
placed our trust in Lom6, believing that it would work, and acted
accordingly in mandating the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNAMSIL). With recent developments in Sierra Leone, we have to take
a fresh look at the peace structure and the peacekeeping mandate we had
approved.,
61
From the foregoing statements, it is clear that, although there
was disagreement at the meeting on whether or not to revise UNAMSIL
mandate to enable it meet the changing circumstances in Sierra Leone,
all participants agreed that the mandate was a peacekeeping one. No state
argued that the mandate justified an inference of authorization of
enforcement action by the Security Council. Hence, it is contended here
that notwithstanding the wording of the mandate and the adoption of
Resolution 1270 under Chapter VII, UNAMSIL mission was a
peacekeeping operation, with limited power to use force under specified
circumstances.
57 Id. at 6-8.
58 Id. at 11.
59 Id. at 16.
60 Id. at 11. The Agreement refened to by My Hasmy is the Lom6 Peace Accord, supra note 27.
61 Id. at 12.
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It is instructive to note that Resolution 1289, which revised the
UNAMSIL mandate, removed from it any words that might give rise to
an inference of authorization of enforcement action. It solely authorized
UNAMSIL to "facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian
assistance along specified thoroughfares., 62 The wording of this
provision is remarkably different from that in Resolution 1270. In the
latter, the UNAMSIL mandate had included the use of necessary means
to "facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. 63 This phrase, it is
contended, is much broader than the one contained in Resolution 1289 in
that it does not define the limit beyond which UNAMSIL may not render
humanitarian assistance. The effect of this alteration is that, under
Resolution 1289, UNAMSIL has no authority to deliver humanitarian
assistance beyond the specified thoroughfares.
Undoubtedly, the ambiguous nature of UNAMSIL's mandate
adversely affected its implementation. It is not clear what circumstances
would qualify as threats of physical violence. 4 Nor is the phrase
responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG free
from ambiguities. Although there was some co-operation between
ECOMOG, which had at all times been implementing enforcement
action, and protecting U.N. personnel with same, and UNOMIL troops at
this stage, Resolution 1270 clearly envisaged a different mandate and
command regime for UNAMSIL. Thus, there was a greater need for the
Security Council to elaborate what the responsibilities of ECOMOG
would be under this Resolution.
Unlike analogous resolutions adopted by the Security Council
with respect to conflicts occurring elsewhere, in which the U.N. has had
to act in conjunction with other international organizations, 6 Resolution
1270 does not provide for joint command of troops. Therefore, upon
deployment of UNAMSIL troops to Sierra Leone, the troops had to
operate alongside the ECOMOG troops but under a separate command
regime. Resolutions 128966 and 1299,67 which revised and increased
UNAMSIL's mandate respectively, and Resolution 13 17,6 which
62 Resolution 1289, supra note 52, at 3, para. 10(b).
63 Supra note 39.
64 Eleven British paratroopers were taken hostage by a Sierra Leone rebel faction, the "West Side
Boys," between late August and early September, an occurrence that typifies an instance that could
have fallen under this provision had the Resolution already been adopted.
65 See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 401 lth mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES. 1244 (1999). Resolution 1244 provides
for joint command between the Kosovo Forces (KFOR) and NATO, which the Resolution expressly
requests in order to substantially participate in the mission.
66 Resolution 1289, supra note 53.
67 U.N. SCOR, 4145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES.1299 (2000).
68 U.N. SCOR, 4193d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES.1317 (2000).
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extended its terms, did not touch upon this crucial aspect of 'joint'
military operation involving two different international organizations.
2. Need Resolution 1270 be more precise?
There exist several reasons for it to be expected that the U.N.
would spell out, as clear as possible, the rules of engagement and the
nature of the relationship of its mission with that of ECOWAS. Up until
the adoption of Resolution 1270, there were little or no practical
problems between ECOMOG troops and their U.N. counterparts, at least
in terms of command and control of their respective missions. The
reasons for this calm relationship between the two organizations are not
far fetched.
In the first phase of its intervention in Sierra Leone, ECOWAS
acted under its two Protocols-the Protocol on Non-Aggression and the
Protocol on Mutual Defense and Assistance-and was constantly
informing the U.N. of its activities under Article 54 of the U.N.
Charter. 69 It enjoyed absolute discretion over the command of its troops
and exerted total control over political decisions governing their
activities. It assumed its own mandate, as it deemed fit in the
circumstances, and superintended virtually all of the peace accords with
conflicting parties. On the other hand, UNOMSIL was only an observer
mission. It had no peacekeeping roles to perform, except, like UNOMIL
did in Liberia, to monitor the implementation of the disarmament
agreement and the overall military and security situation in Sierra Leone.
In fact, the respective roles to be performed by ECOMOG and
UNOMSIL were formally set out in a letter from the President of Sierra
Leone to the Security Council 70 which somehow complemented the
details of the relationship between the two missions in Resolution 1181.
In fact, UNOMSIL was to be protected by ECOMOG troops.7'
The above scenario was, to say the obvious, superficially
conducive for a 'co-operation' to be assumed between the two
organizations. In reality, however, the two organizations had little or
nothing to actually co-operate about as far as their mandates were
concerned. At this stage of their missions, the two organizations were
performing widely divergent tasks that could not possibly collide.
ECOWAS was mainly preoccupied with seeking ways to completely
route out the rebels from Sierra Leone's political landscape and
consolidate the reinstated Tejan Kabbah on the governance of the
69 The Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, U.N. Doe.
S/1998.249 (1998). See also slnews, supra note 10.
70 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme, U.N. Doc. S/1 998.741 (1998).
71 Art. 1 of Decision C/AHSG/DEC.1/8/99 Redefining the Mandate of ECOMOG in SielTa Leone
(on file with author).
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country, by means and measures it decided on with unlimited freedom.
7 2
UNOMSIL, on the other hand, was only monitoring the military and
security situation in Sierra Leone with no real concern, whatsoever with
the fate of the rebels, or indeed, the safety of the democratic government
of Tej an Kabbah.73
Towards the end of 1999 however, the relationship between
UNOMSIL and ECOMOG turned sour on account of two immediate
factors. The first was the introduction of UNAMSIL into the political
equation of the Sierra Leone crisis, equipped with a "peacekeeping"
mandate. 4 It must be pointed out that before the adoption of Resolution
1270, the U.N. entirely endorsed the main objective of ECOWAS, the
reinstatement of the Kabbah government7 , and heartily welcomed "the
return of that government" to Sierra Leone, notwithstanding that it was
restored by the use of unauthorized force by ECOMOG.76
Naturally, ECOWAS had expected that the new resolution would
complement the enforcement mandate ECOMOG forces were already
implementing.77 The second reason was the adoption by ECOWAS
member states of a new protocol for the regulation of its interventions
within two months of adopting Resolution 1270. 7' This protocol, it must
be emphasized, empowers ECOWAS to undertake enforcement action
without seeking the authorization of the Security Council.79
In these circumstances, tension soon began to grow between the
two sides. On December 21, 2000, the Nigerian President, Olusegun
Obasanjo, informed the U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, that
Nigeria could not accept two peacekeeping forces in the same country,
and that Nigeria would withdraw from the ECOMOG force by the end of
February.8 ° The Ghanaian and Guinean contingents also gave similar
72 For the objectives of ECOWAS in Sierra Leone, see the Declaration of the Committee of Four on
the Situation in Sierra Leone, Abidjan, 29-30 July 1997 (on file with author).
73 This role would however be assumed later by UNAMSIL. See the Russian's statement during the
4139th meeting of the Security Council, supra note 53, at 16.
74 (emphasis added).
75 Final Communiqu6, Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers ofECOWAS, Conakry 26 June 1997
(on file with author).
76 Resolution 1156, supra note 18.
77 The ECOWAS Director of Legal Affairs, Mr. Roger Laloupo, disclosed this fact to the author
during an interview in March 2000. The author had asked specifically what led to the discord
between ECOMOG and UNAMSIL forces. Interview with Roger Laloupo, Director of Legal
Affairs, ECOWAS, in Abuja, Nig., (Mar. 2000).
78 The Protocol on collective security was adopted in furtherance of Article 58 of the Revised
Treaty, supra note 1.
79 See discussion infra.
80 See generally http://www.sierra-leone.org/slnewsOlOO.html.
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indications. 81 President Obasanjo's position, it must be pointed out, was
complementary to the hostility already going on between the UNAMSIL
and ECOMOG commanders. Thus, it seems appropriate to submit that it
was the introduction of UNAMSIL, without a detailed demarcation of
responsibilities between it and ECOMOG troops despite their divergent
mandates, and the adoption of a new legal framework by ECOWAS, that
undermined the supposed cooperative relationship between the U.N. and
ECOWAS in Sierra Leone.
The failure of the U.N. to take these developments on board at
the implementation stage of Resolution 1270's mandate led to serious
consequences, such as the virtual erosion of U.N. command and control
in Sierra Leone, leading to the withdrawal of the Indian contingent from
UNAMSIL. The Nigerian, Ghanaian and Guinean ECOMOG contingent
also withdrew from Sierra Leone, a situation that prompted the U.N. to
increase UNAMSIL from 6,000 to 11,000 troops.
The next issue to examine is the practical effect of ECOWAS'
new protocol on the implementation of Resolution 1270. The focus here
shall be on the adoption of a peacekeeping mandate by UNAMSIL and
the lack of clarity as to the command regime between UNAMSIL and
ECOMOG forces. An outline of relevant provisions of the new protocol
is included, but before embarking on a detailed examination of them, it is
worthwhile to say a few words about the circumstances in which
ECOWAS agreed to return to Sierra Leone. It is the combined effects of
these occurrences that set the stage for the events that led to the collapse
of the UNAMSIL command.
C. ECOWAS' New Protocol: A Brief Outline of its Objectives
The legal regime upon which ECOWAS premised the first phase
of its intervention in Sierra Leone consisted of the provisions of the
Protocol on Non-Aggression12 and the Protocol on the Mutual Defense
and Assistance (PMAD)83 as well as the principles of general
international law governing peacekeeping. The adoption of the Protocol
Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management,
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security [hereinafter Protocol] by
ECOWAS member states on December 10, 1999,84 provided a catalyst to
81 Resolution 1289, supra note 52, at 2, para. 7, "takes note of the decision of the Governments of
Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana to withdraw their remaining ECOMOG contingents from Sierra Leone,
as reported in the letter to the Secretary-general of 23 December 1999."
82 Adopted on April 22 1978; See Report of the Secretary-General on the Question ofLiberia, U.N.
Doc. S/25402, at 6 (1993); See also M. Weller, supra note 2, at 18.
83 Adopted May 29, 1981. See also M. Weller, supra note 2, at 19-20.
84 The Protocol was adopted at Lom, Togo, on December 10, 1999. Although it is yet to be
ratified, it entered into force provisionally (Article 57 (1)) upon signature by all Heads of State and
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the ensuing discord between the ECOMOG troops and their UNAMSIL
counterparts. The Protocol not only recast the role of ECOWAS in the
collective security of its hemisphere, it indeed controverted the very
foundation upon which the initial co-operation between UNOMSIL and
ECOMOG had been based: the legal framework of Chapter VIII of the
U.N. Charter. 5
To be sure, Article 10(c) of the Protocol empowers ECOWAS to
dispense with the Security Council authorization as sine qua non to its
enforcement actions in West African conflicts.8 6 In addition, Article 34
contains comprehensive provisions that will enable ECOWAS to retain
the command of its troops and the control of political decisions affecting
their operation in the field of deployment.87
It must be emphasized at this juncture that ECOWAS had
manifested unequivocally, right from the days of its intervention in
Liberia, a predilection for being in charge of its troops in terms of
command and control.88 The fact that an outright conflict did not arise
between the ECOMOG forces and those of the United Nations Observer
Mission in Liberia, UNOMIL, owes more to the docile nature of the task
the latter had to perform than it being a manifestation of cordiality
between the two groups. 89
With Sierra Leone, the ECOWAS quest for an unquestionable
authority over the command of its troops and the political control of
decisions concerning implementation of their mandate became ever more
pronounced. At the meeting of chiefs of defense staff of contributing
States to ECOMOG, held in Abuja, Nigeria, on April 15, 1999,90 the
organization "reiterated that the general [c]ommand and [c]ontrol of the
Governments of ECOWAS. The author obtained a copy from ECOWAS Headquarters in Nigeria
while on an internship between March 25 and April 5, 2000. See also 5 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY
LAW 231 (2000). For a commentary on the Protocol, see Ademola Abass, supra note 4.
85 In a personal interview with the Director of Legal Affairs, the author was informed that it would
not be in the best interest of ECOWAS to wait for the authorisation of the Security Council at the
outbreak of violence in West Africa. Interview with Roger Laloupo, Director of Legal Affairs,
ECOWAS, in Abuja, Nig. (Mar. 28, 2000).
86 This Article empowers the Mediation and Security Council (MSC) to, inter alia, "authorise all
forms of intervention and decide particularly on the deployment of political and military missions."
5 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 231, 237 (2000).
87 Id. at 248.
88 First Session of the Community Standing Mediation Committee, Banjul, 1990, Article 11 (2) (on
file with author).
89 For an analysis of the joint action in Liberia, see Funmi Olonisakin, UN Co-operation with
Regional Organisations in Peacekeeping: The Experience of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia, 3
INT'L PEACEKEEPING 33 (1996).
90 Final Communiqug (on file with author).
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participating troops are vested on the Force Commander [sic]." Thus, it
is contended that Article 10, outlining the enormous powers the new
Mediation and Security Council possesses, especially subsection (2)(c),
which empowers it to authorize all forms of actions, and Article 34,
which sets out the chain of command, culminated from ECOWAS
practice since it launched its intervention in the Liberian conflicts.
In effect, through its Protocol, ECOWAS signaled a radical
departure, not only from the legal regime under which its first experience
of intervention was perfected, but also from the classical relationship that
existed between its own collective security regime and that of the U.N. In
regards to the latter, ECOWAS did deliberately decide to do away with
the provisions of Article 53(1) of the U.N. Charter mandating regional
arrangements to first seek the authorization of the Security Council
before embarking on an enforcement action. In response to the concern
raised by Professor Margaret Vogt, one of the resource persons consulted
when drafting the Protocol, about the potential impact of Article 10(2)(c)
on Article 53(1) of the U.N. Charter, the ECOWAS Director of Legal
Affairs responded that:
The meeting [of experts] considered these observations made by
Prof. Vogt and was of the view that whilst the sub region
appreciates the importance of its obligations under the United
Nations Charter, its recent experience has shown that the cost of
waiting for the United Nations authorization Could be very high in
terms of life and resources. 9'
Noteworthy in the above quoted statement is that, right from the
conception of its new legal regime, ECOWAS had decided not to
contingent its legal ability to intervene in conflicts occurring within the
region to a prior authorization by the Security Council. Indeed, in the
meeting preceding its return to Sierra Leone, as discussed below,
ECOWAS made this new position quite obvious.
1. ECO WAS' Conditions for Participating in Sierra Leone (Phase Two)
Shortly after the deployment of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, the
rebel movement in Sierra Leone captured 500 hundred U.N. personnel.92
This development impelled the U.N. to request the re-entry of the
Nigerian contingent-which, in substance, means ECOWAS-into the
Sierra Leone crisis.93 At a meeting held in Abuja, the capital city of
Nigeria, ECOWAS accepted the U.N. invitation, but then laid down three
vital conditions that would govern its action if it were to return to Sierra
Leone.94
91 Passage taken from Ademola Abass, supra note 4, at 223-4.
92 U.N. Doc. S/PV.4139, supra note 53, at 9.
93 Id. at 5.
94 http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/news2/nn785902.htm (last visited May 22, 2000).
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Under its first condition, the alliance presented to the U.N. three
different modalities for participating in any operation directed toward the
resolution of the conflict. 95 The first of these was for ECOWAS to
contribute its own troops as part of the UNAMSIL soldiers.96 Under this
arrangement, soldiers of the ECOWAS monitoring group, ECOMOG,
would operate under the United Nations command. As for the second
alternative, ECOMOG would operate under the Lom6 Peace Accord as
partners with the U.N. However, the alliance did not specify what the
arrangement would be as per the regime of command and control of
forces under this option. Nevertheless, since the situation under the
second option would have obliged the two organizations to work side by
side as they did before ECOWAS withdrew from Sierra Leone, it is to be
assumed that each organization would have retained the command of its
troops. As to the last option, ECOMOG troops would completely
supplant the U.N., forcing the U.N. to revert to the observer role it played
during the operation in Liberia, or during the UNOMSIL period in Sierra
Leone.97
Irrespective of which of these three options ECOWAS might
elect, the organization stated explicitly through its Director of
Information, Dr. Adrienne Diop, that "the West African component
under ECOMOG in Sierra Leone will have its own command."98 It
follows from this assertion that, whatever might emerge from the three
options proposed by ECOWAS, it will not, in the final analysis, affect
the fundamental question of who commands and controls ECOMOG
forces that might be deployed. ECOWAS indeed made good on the threat
not to subjugate its troops to the U.N. command when, following a rift
between its commander and its U.N. counterpart, ECOMOG forces
obstinately refused to take orders from the latter.
The second condition laid down by ECOWAS at the Abuja
meeting was that no matter what relationship might exist between
ECOWAS and U.N. troops, ECOWAS would implement its own
mandate.99 This, it declared in advance, would be enforcement action
95 The Security Council recognised these modalities during its 4139th meeting, supra note 53, at 11;
See also BBC NEWS, Nigeria Sets Intervention Terms (May 10, 2000), at http://www.
bbc.co.uk/hienglish/world/africa/newsid_743000/743219.stm.
96 http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/news2/nn785902.html (last visited May 22, 2000).
97See Madu Onuorah, Segun Ayeoyenikan and Tunji Oketunbi, ECOWAS to Deploy 3,000 Troops
to Sierra Leone, http://www.ngrguardiannews.com.
98 Id.
99 Id. In fact, the Vice-President of Nigeria, Atiku Abubakar, expressed the view, with respect to the
first phase of the ECOWAS mission that "the command ought to have gone to Nigeria, because
Nigeria - having been in Sierra Leone for quite some time, and quite familiar with the terrain - would
have made a better job of it." See generally http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/ world/africa.
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contrary to a peacekeeping mandate UNAMSIL was already
implementing.1 °° The third and final condition given by ECOWAS was
that the U.N. would meet all expenses incurred by the organization in the
course of discharging its mandate. 10 1
Several aspects of these conditions merit consideration.
However, we shall only focus our attention on two vital issues: first, the
proposal by ECOWAS to retain the command of troops; second, the
proposal to implement the enforcement mandate as against the U.N.
peacekeeping alternative. Two factors would appear to have motivated
these conditions. Firstly, ECOWAS was clearly unwilling to return to a
conflict where it would not be in charge of its own troops. The events
leading to its withdrawal during the first phase of its mission apparently
informed the decision to set this matter straight well in advance of its
return to Sierra Leone. Secondly, ECOWAS had adopted a new protocol,
following the withdrawal of its key contingents from Sierra Leone, and
was ready to commence the regulation of its collective security activities
in West Africa, in accordance with its own law.
102
Obviously, it is strategically more rewarding for ECOWAS to
return to Sierra Leone under its own legal regime which not only frees up
its actions from the Security Council authorization but also relieves it of
the obligation to report such activities under Article 54 of the Charter.
Article 52(3) of its Protocol only obligates ECOWAS to "inform the
United Nations of any military intervention undertaken in pursuit of the
objectives of this Mechanism."' 13 As this writer has partly argued
elsewhere, the insertion of the phrases 'military intervention' and
'undertaken' in this article, as against the requirement of Article 54 of
the U.N. Charter that regional arrangements report actions "undertaken"
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 In a private interview with the ECOWAS Director of Legal Affairs in April 2000, the Director
confirmed to the author that the real motivation behind the Protocol was the need to free ECOWAS
from the many restrictions of the U.N. Charter. He explained that while the Charter has imposed
many obligations on regional organisations, it has not imposed similar obligations on the U.N. to
intervene in crises. He cited the tragedy in Rwanda as an example in which the U.N. Security
Council had not been willing to do much. Thus, he put a question to the author: 'Should the
circumstances of Rwanda erupt in an ECOWAS State in the future and the U.N. adopt the approach
it did in Rwanda, what do you think ECOWAS should do'?. Interview with Roger Laloupo, Director
of Legal Affairs, ECOWAS, in Abuja, Nig. (Apr. 2000); For an official version of ECOWAS'
justification for designing a treaty that dispenses with the U.N. authorisation, see also Meeting of
Experts on the Draft Protocol Relating to the Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management,
Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security, 17-19 Nov. 1999, Lone, Togo, at 6 (on file with author).
103 See Ademola Abass, supra note 4, at 220.
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or in "contemplation," provides a leeway for ECOWAS to circumvent
this obligation in two ways.
It is contended that the rationale for Article 54 of the U.N.
Charter requiring regional arrangements to report not only actions
already "undertaken" but also those in "contemplation" is to enable the
Security Council to exercise some control on the measures a regional
arrangement proposes to undertake. ECOWAS will almost always
present the U.N. with a fait accomplis, since under its Protocol, it is only
obligated to report actions it has already taken.
Moreover, under its Protocol the actions ECOWAS is obligated
to report to the U.N. are more tightly defined than the ones under Article
54. The actions to be reported under the Protocol must be of military
nature, and must constitute an intervention. Thus, where ECOWAS
decides to use overwhelming non-military force, as economic sanction or
oil embargo-its two potent sanctions in Liberia and Sierra Leone-to
compel obedience with its own decisions, it has no duty to report that to
the U.N. 10 4 Additionally, where ECOWAS applies a disproportionate
military force within a peacekeeping operation, such that will normally
bring the action within enforcement action under the U.N. Charter, it is
not obligated to report to the U.N., for such actions are not 'military
interventions' as such. At most, such usage of preponderant military
force in the context of a peacekeeping operation might only impugn the
legality of the action under the law of peacekeeping and compromise the
integrity of the mandate.
Article 10(2)(c) of the Protocol empowers the Mediation and
Security Council (MSC) to "authorize all forms of intervention and
104 It is a common view among legal scholars that since states may, as a matter of course, impose
economic sanctions individually, they may, as part of their privileges as states, pull such sanctions
together and impose them collectively without recourse to the U.N. Security Council's authorisation
under Article 53(1). The crux of this contention is that economic sanctions do not constitute
enforcement action in the language of the U.N. Charter. Thus, the enforcement action referred to by
that Article must be assumed to be military action. This argument is faulty. There is a remarkable
difference between a single state imposing an economic sanction against another state and a
collection of states doing so. Where a collection of states impose sanction with the desire to hurt the
target state and forcefully induce or coerce it to comply with certain obligations, there is no logical
reason why that should not constitute enforcement action. Furthermore, in the light of the prohibition
of use of force by Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, very few states find attraction in military force.
Indeed, superpowers like the United States may actually cause as much harm, even if not as drastic,
through economic sanctions rather than through military action, better still without legal
repercussions under the U.N. Charter. Since such states are encouraged by the Charter's non-
penalisation of economic sanctions, it is predicted that the consequences for the worst future
violations of Article 2(4) may consist of economic sanctions directed at undermining the political
integrity of these states.
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decide particularly on the deployment of political missions.105 The
Protocol further provides for a Commander'0 6 and a Special
Representative. 10 7 The whole structure of this Protocol is to make
ECOWAS exert total control over whatever troops it may deploy, and to
retain the command of its mission. This indeed is the underlying factor
for the adoption of the Protocol.
The next question that arises therefore is, despite a background
of distrust and crisis between UNAMSIL and ECOWAS in the first
phase of the intervention, and the adoption of the ECOWAS Protocol,
why did the U.N. not address the situation in the resolutions emerging
after 1270? How did this contribute to the problem experienced by the
UNAMSIL command in the second phase?
2. The Crisis of Command and Control in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL
vs. ECOMOG
At the close of the Abuja meeting, ECOWAS agreed to contribute troops
to UNAMSIL.' ° This was an endorsement of its first condition, having
jettisoned the idea of operating under the Lom6 Peace Accord, which had
been frequently breached by the rebels, or supplanting the U.N.
altogether, a proposal that was, in the real sense of the matter, not a very
realistic one. In effect, this means that ECOWAS agreed to become part
of UNAMSIL and subordinate its troops to the UNAMSIL command.
Yet, despite ECOWAS' adoption of the most credible and pragmatic of
its three proposals under the circumstances, the participation of its troops
in UNAMSIL was marked by mutual distrust between the two sides from
the very start.
While the issues that catalyzed the rift between the UNAMSIL
commander, Major-General Vijah Jetley and his ECOMOG counterpart,
Major-General Victor Malu, were traceable to certain reports allegedly
emanating from the former, it is believed that these issues only masked a
deep-seated hostility between the two parties, dating back to the first
phase of their mission. 0 9 A few months after the Nigerian contingent
returned to Sierra Leone and formally joined forces with UNAMSIL, the
ECOMOG commander, Major-General Malu, declared that "We
[Nigerians] are not going to serve under the man [Jetley] in whatever
105 See Ademola Abass, supra note 4, at 220.
106 Protocol, supra note 4, Article 33.
107 Protocol, supra note 4, Article 34(1).
108 http://www.ngrguardiannews.com.
109 See Jetley's Report on the Crisis in Sierra Leone (saying that "When General Kpamber went to
the U.N. HQ., New York, he was very disappointed to learn that he was not going to be the Force
Commander and that Nigeria would have three battalions out of this they had to concede one
battalion to the Guineans.') http://www.Siera-Leone.org/jetley.
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circumstances. And if he is not removed he will not get our cooperation,
and we are the largest contingent in the force." 1n In a more telling
episode, General Malu had later alleged that General Jetley's problem
with the Nigerian contingent arose from the latter's strident opposition to
what they perceived as Jetley's lack of consultation and the "dominance
of Indian Generals" at UNAMSIL headquarters. In addition, Malu
asserted that the Nigerian contingent stressed to the UNAMSIL
commander, at a meeting attended by the U.N. Secretary-General, that
"in a multinational force you do not exert the kind of control you apply
over your national army."' 1
Whatever might be the real cause of the rift in the leadership of
UNAMSIL may as well remain mysterious for our purpose. What is not
controverted, however, is that there has been series of problems in the
command of troops and the control of their mission. In an interview with
a BBC correspondent concerning the withdrawal of the Indian
UNAMSIL contingent, 12 the spokesman for the U.N. Secretary-General,
Fred Eckhard, admitted, "I can't exclude that the decision had something
to do with the leadership problems that we've had with this mission."' 
13
The U.N. Secretary-General himself, Kofi Annan, had noted in an
assessment report that there were "serious shortfalls in capability
encountered by UNAMSIL in the recent past with regard to the
command and control."' 14 In a more categorical reference to the looming
crisis, Mr. Fowler, the Canadian delegate to the Security Council's
4139th meeting, after advocating the creation of "a strong, united and
cohesive force" in Sierra Leone, noted that the proposed force "should
take the form of an expanded UNAMSIL and should respect the
fundamental military principle of unity of command, in this case the
command of Major-General Jetley.' 15
The reference to "unity of command" in that quoted statement
perhaps answers the question why Resolution 1270 did not specify the
110 Sierra Leone Web, News Archives, (Sept. 10, 2000), at http://www.sierra-leone.org/slnews
0900.html.
111 Id. (emphasis added).
112 On the Indians' withdrawal from UNAMSIL, see the transcript of the UNAMSIL Press
Briefing. Press Briefing, United Nations: Daily Press Briefing of Office of Spokesman for Secretary-
General, available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2000/20000922. db092200.doc.html
(last visited Sept. 22, 2000).
113 Press Briefing, United Nations: Daily Press Briefing of Office of Spokesman for Secretary-
General, available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2000/20000922.db092200.doc. html
(last visited Sept. 21, 2000).
114 Sierra Leone Web, News Archives, (Sept. 20, 2000), at http://www.sierraleone.org/slnews
0900.html.
115 S/PV.4139, supra note 53, at 8.
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command regime envisaged for an expanded UNAMSIL in Resolution
1289. Clearly, the Security Council had expected (or assumed) that
insofar as ECOMOG forces would form part of UNAMSIL, a 'unified'
command structure would become applicable. It seems plausible to
observe that leaving such an inference to be drawn by ECOMOG forces
seemed ill advised under the circumstances. With this unclear approach
in Resolution 1270, the Security Council would appear to have charted a
course of 'joint' action that, for all intent and purposes, was bound to
founder during implementation.
4. Factors that Militated Against UNAMSIL Command in Sierra
Leone
The difficulty experienced by UNAMSIL, in the area of
command and control of its mission, would appear to have stemmed
from two competing scenarios. On the one hand, the U.N. would appear
to be reluctant to discountenance the predilection of the largest provider
of ECOMOG, Nigeria, which would rather have things done in its own
way. 116 To antagonize the Nigerians would be to risk another exit of their
ECOMOG contingent (and most probably) the Guineans and the
Ghanaians contingents as well, from Sierra Leone.
On the other hand, the U.N. did not want to be seen as
succumbing to the pressure mounted by the Nigerians to substitute the
UNAMSIL commander Jetley with a Nigerian, an option that must be
expected to have attracted unpleasant consequences under the
circumstances. The current leader of UNAMSIL, Oluyemi Adeniji, is a
Nigerian, and so is the deputy force commander, Brigadier General
Mohammed who is, at the time of this writing, was acting in the stead of
the departed Indian commander, General Jetley. To have consented to a
substitution of Major General Jetley with yet another Nigerian would be
to completely subordinate the UNAMSIL force to ECOWAS command,
and, thus, subserve the collective will of the international community in
Sierra Leone to the dictates of a regional hegemon. In short, such a
decision would have made the UNAMSIL mission a regional action with
international imprimatur.
The conflict between ECOWAS and the U.N. in the area of
command and control succinctly exemplify the complications that
characterize joint peacekeeping operations by the U.N. and regional
organizations. It is to be expected that contributing countries, which are
in charge of the command of troops, would almost certainly want to be in
control of political decisions, especially those affecting their mandate.
This problem is likely to feature more strongly in missions dominated by
116 The Nigerians clearly wanted an enforcement action and were first prepared to infer such a
mandate from Resolution 1270. However, their inability to hold UNAMSIL to this sort of action led
in part to their frustration with the UNAMSIL command.
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states bearing the most of the human and material cost of a crisis.' 17 It is
in this context that General Malu's reference to the "dominance of Indian
Generals" is quiet revealing.
In fact, in the U.N. practice, precedents indicate that there is a
strong link between the command of troops and the control of political
decisions relating to their actions. Nowhere is this linkage better
manifested than perhaps in the 1991 Operation Desert Storm. 118 The
allied states, having the command of troops, so marginalized other
participating states, and the U.N. itself, in controlling the action, that the
U.N. Secretary-General of the day, Javier Perez de Cuellar, lamented that
all "we know about the war" is "what we hear from the three members of
the Security Council which are involved-Britain, France and the United
States-which every two or three days report to the Council, after the
actions have taken place. The Council, which has authorized all this, is
informed only after the military actions have taken place. 19
Concerning Sierra Leone, the problems of command and control
between the UNAMSIL and ECOWAS was worsened by many factors.
The prospect of this problem abating in future joint operations between
the U.N. and ECOWAS, or other regional organizations for that matter,
is indeed very dim. In many respects, Resolution 1270, which authorized
the UNAMSIL mission, was, in effect, a dead horse by the time it came
into force.'20 Although the Resolution came into existence before
ECOWAS adopted its new protocol, its implementation by UNAMSIL
should have, in the very least, addressed the changes that have occurred
within ECOWAS' collective security framework. This did not happen.
Hence vital issues, such as command and control and divergent mandate,
to state the obvious, were left hanging precariously.
It would have been thought that Resolution 1270 and those that
followed would take cognizance of the circumstances before their
adoption. This would include recognizing the particular position of
ECOWAS and its predilections: it was under its own command and
implementing its own mandate. Paying particular attention to these issues
would have, in the least, impressed it upon the Security Council the
117 It is generally acknowledged that Nigeria bore the substantial part of the human and materials
cost of ECOWAS mission in Liberia between 1989 and 1997 and Siena Leone between 1997 and
1999 when the U.N. decided to take over the peacekeeping mission itself See BBC NEWS, Nigeria
Sets Intervention Terms, May 10, 2000, available at http://news.bbc.
co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid
118 See John Quigley, supra note 47, at 1.
119 Leonard Doyle, Crisis in the Gulf: U.N 'Has No Role in Running War'INDEPENDENT (London),
Feb. 11, 1991, at 2 (interview with Prez de Cuellar).
120 See statements of the representatives of Malaysia and Bangladesh at the Security Council 4139th
meeting, supra notes 59, 60.
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urgent need to spell out details about command and control, especially
since UNAMSIL tasks were to be radically different from those
performed by UNOMSIL. In contrast, during the Liberian crisis,
Resolution 866 had noted that the deployment of UNOMIL in Liberia
"would be the first mission undertaken by the United Nations in co-
operation with a peace-keeping mission already set up by another
organizations." 121 Remarkably, the then Secretary-General of the U.N.
had issued a report which detailed the respective roles to be performed
by UNOMIL and ECOMOG.122 This despite the fact that UNOMIL was
only an observer mission with no real possibility of running into any
problems with ECOWAS which had been in Liberia three years before
the U.N. moved in. A similar step was particularly more desirable in
Sierra Leone where UNAMSIL had a peacekeeping mandate.
Furthermore, Resolution 1270 was all but clear in its few
specifications, especially as to the distribution of roles between
ECOWAS, which naturally assumed the right to take decisions regarding
Sierra Leone, 123 and the U.N., which arrived late on the scene and
consistently shunned the robust mandate favored by ECOWAS.
124
Unfortunately, the Security Council missed an opportunity to arrest the
problem when Resolution 1289, which revised Resolution 1270, failed to
address this perennial problem. Coming, as it did, in the aftermath of the
withdrawal of three ECOMOG contingents from Sierra Leone, and after
the declaration by Nigeria that it could not accept two peacekeeping
forces in the same country, the Security Council had reasons to anticipate
the future of a joint operation between UNAMSIL and ECOMOG. Thus,
it was more crucial at this point for the Security Council to use its
subsequent resolutions to put these matters straight. This was not to be.
In sharp contrast to the Sierra Leone scenario, Resolution 1244
concerning Kosovo was by far more succinct as to the relationship
between the Kosovo Forces (KFOR), which was to operate with the full
participation of the U.N. and NATO member states, and Operation
Allied Force, executed only by the latter. 125 In the Security Council
debate leading to the adoption of Resolution 1244, Russia and China
121 Resolution 866, supra note 3, at 1.
122 Report of the Secretary General on Liberia, U.N. Doc. S/26422, at 4 (1993).
123 For instance, in responding to General Jetley's report on Nigeria's leadership of UNAMSIL, the
Nigerian president charged: "When did he (Jetley) get there? How far has he gone? What has he
achieved?" Sierra Leone Web, News Archives, (Sept. 17, 2000), at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/slnews0900.html.
124 Mark Tran and Claudia McElroy, U.N. Failure in Sierra Leone Feeds Recriminations:
Foreigners Await Rescuers as Nigeria Sends Troops to Reverse Coup, GUARDIAN (London), May
29, 1997, at 15.
125 Resolution 1244, supra note 64.
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maintained that the KFOR should not be seen as an ex post ratification of
NATO's military action against FRY. 126 In recognition of a partnership
between the U.N. and NATO in the new arrangement, the resolution
provides for a joint command regime. 127 In practical terms, this implies
that the line of command and control pursued by NATO during its
intervention in Kosovo, and the regime of mandate therein, ceased upon
the entering into force of Resolution 1244. This, apart from the fact that
the major contributing states to KFOR, the United Kingdom, France and
US, are all permanent members of the Security Council, and so is Russia.
These states could expectedly resolve any crisis respecting command and
control within themselves.
An indication made by Russia and China during the Council's
4011 th meeting, or a categorical specification of the command regime in
Resolution 1270, was highly desirable in the Sierra Leone situation.
Although the Canadian representative referred to the need of all forces to
respect UNAMSIL's unified command, this was not adequate due to the
present circumstances. The need for a more vigorous demarcation of
command structure was all the more compelling in the light of the
perceived excessive use of force by ECOMOG troops against one of the
parties to the Sierra Leone conflict. Unarguably, ECOWAS had used
force markedly disproportionate to the type associated with peacekeeping
operations during the first phase of the intervention. It is through such a
use of force that it had reinstated the government of Tejan Kabbah in
1997. While the ends of that unauthorized use of force could be regarded
as a laudable achievement in itself, this cannot obviate the fact that the
means for accomplishing it was in total disregard of both the U.N.
Charter and customary principles of peacekeeping.
Thus, whether ECOWAS viewed the first phase of its
intervention in Sierra Leone as a peacekeeping operation per se, or an
enforcement action, a huge question mark hangs over the legality of its
use of force to restore Kabbah. Regional arrangements may not
undertake enforcement action without the authorization of the Security
Council. 128 When such arrangements are operating in a peacekeeping
version, the use of force is forbidden except in self-defense. At the
material time, ECOWAS' collective security activities were still
governed by its previous protocols and customary rules of peacekeeping.
Under both regimes, it observed its obligations under the Chapter VIII of
the U.N. Charter, and its action during those times would be measured in
accordance with those laws.
126 See the views of Russia and China in the debate leading to the adoption of Resolution 1244, in
the 401 lth of the Security Council, 10 June 1999.
127 Resolution 1244, supra note 64, at 6.
128 U.N. Charter art. 53, para. 1.
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In these circumstances, the sub-regional alliance could not be
regarded as having pursued a pure peacekeeping mandate during the first
phase of its intervention, for it had compromised its impartiality. If there
was any doubt about the real intention of ECOWAS as to how it wanted
to pursue the resolution of the Sierra Leone crisis in the second phase, it
cleared this when it openly endorsed an enforcement operation during the
Abuja meeting. This could only mean one thing then: that from the start
of the second phase of its intervention in Sierra Leone, the vision of
ECOWAS greatly differed from that of the U.N.
D. How may the U.N. Tackle the Problem of Command and
Control in Joint Operations?
It is to be expected that the problem of command of troops and
the political control of their action would be more pervasive in situations
where the largest providing states in a joint operation are not in
command of the U.N. mission in a region where they have major
influence. 129 One possible way of minimizing this problem would be for
the U.N. to be more precise in its resolutions, about its relationship with
a regional arrangement already mediating in a conflict prior to its
involvement.
To this end, adopting Resolution 1270 under Chapter VIII, as it
did under Resolution 1132, would have put ECOMOG squarely under
the U.N.'s direct authority. Legally speaking though, the absence of such
direct subordination of ECOWAS to the U.N. command regime by
means of a resolution should not really matter, since, in any case, Article
54 of the U.N. Charter obligates regional arrangements to report all
activities they undertake or contemplate.
However, by the time ECOWAS accepted to return to Sierra
Leone, a huge cloud already hung over its readiness and willingness to
abide by its obligation under Article 54, or any of the provisions of
Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter for that matter. Upon adopting a new
protocol, ECOWAS charted an independent regime of collective security
and arrogated to itself all the legal apparatuses of that institution.
Aside from a possible clarification of relationship by means of
its enabling resolutions, the U.N. could have reduced the potential areas
of collision between its mission and that of ECOWAS in yet another
way. Where a regional arrangement stipulates a mandate different from
that pursued by the U.N., as a condition for its participation in an
operation, it is suggested that the U.N. should not encourage or entertain,
as the case may be, the participation of such an organization. This is
especially necessary where troops from the member states of the
organizations are expected to form part of the U.N. mission. However,
129 Tim Butcher & George Jones, British Troops Face UN Threat To Shoot, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), May 16, 2000, at 1.
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such a decision should not preclude the participation of member states of
that organization as may be interested in joining the U.N. mission in their
own right.
Had the U.N. rejected ECOWAS' proposal to retain the
command of troops contributed to UNAMSIL by its member states as a
condition for further participation in Sierra Leone, two major problems
would have been averted. Firstly, there would not have been operational
incoherence, which constantly resulted from ECOWAS implementing a
robust mandate as against the U.N.'s peacekeeping one. Divergent
mandates would necessarily elicit different implementation methods and
this, inevitably, will adversely affect the coherence of the command of
troops. Secondly, had there been a unified mandate, the mission in Sierra
Leone would have been implemented solely in accordance with the
principles of the U.N. Charter and general international law governing
collective security. In the instant case, the decisions, mandate and
operations of ECOWAS, concerning the second phase of its intervention
in the Sierra Leone crisis, entirely originated from its Protocol.
Clear and precise mandates will undoubtedly help in securing a
more concerted effort early in the mission's life. Conversely, multiple
mandates will widen areas of tensions between the U.N. and other
regional arrangements, on the one hand, and between all states
participating in the operation, on the other. For instance, when the British
first deployed to Sierra Leone they consistently maintained that they
were in that country only to rescue their and other Commonwealth
nationals trapped therein. 3 ° Soon thereafter other reasons began to
emerge. 131 However, the British clearly indicated that they would always
remain under their own command.1
32
Although there might be, as it was in Sierra Leone, a dovetailing
of efforts at a later stage in the course of an operation with multiple
mandates, it is potentially dangerous for the U.N. to permit member
states to implement separate mandates alongside its own operation in the
same conflict. At the very least, this development could warrant negative
implications. It could discourage other states from joining the mission,
and for those already participating, it might hasten a decision to
withdraw. A clear example is the persistent complaint by the UNAMSIL
Jordanian contingent that unless NATO member states join UNAMSIL,
130 See the statement of Eldon, the U.K. delegate to the 4139th meeting of the Security Council,
supra note 53, at 7.
131 Id.
132 Kim Sengupta, Colin Brown, & Alex Duval Smith, Sierra Leone: Britain Set To Give Arms Aid,
INDEPENDENT (London), May 16, 2000, at 1, (reporting that "Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff
Hoon, assured the Commons yesterday that British Forces would not be drawn into the escalating
war").
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they too would withdraw. 133 Britain is a NATO member state, but by
implementing its own mandate and retaining the command of its troops
and control of its mission in Sierra Leone, it operated outside the
purview of the UNAMSIL. Certainly, the problem of states
implementing individual mandates alongside U.N.'s presence is capable
of further fragmenting whatever cohesion seems achievable in the
interaction of U.N.-regional arrangements under the auspices of
ambiguous resolutions like 1270.
To conclude this part, it is submitted that vague, unclear and
divergent mandates are a recipe for operational chaos in the joint
implementation of collective security measures. As Sierra Leone
demonstrates the effects of lack of coherence, non-clarification of
relationship between the U.N. and ECOWAS and divergent mandates are
not only felt in the area of command and control, they have deeper
impact on the overall well-being of the mission.
Having considered the difficulties experienced by the
UNAMSIL in the areas of command and control, the nature of
UNAMSIL mandate and its relationship with ECOMOG in the joint
implementation of UNAMSIL mandate, we now turn to the effect of
ECOWAS' new protocol on the customary rules of peacekeeping.
PART TWO
II. The Effects of ECOWAS' New Protocol on the 'Law' of
Peacekeeping
Under its new protocol, ECOWAS no longer requires the
consent of any of its member states in order to intervene in their
conflicts, whether intra or inter-state. Article 27 of the Protocol dispenses
with the rule requiring peacekeeping states to seek and obtain the consent
of a concerned state and other parties to a conflict before they could
intervene. This article states that "the Mechanism shall be applied
according to any of the following procedures. 1 34 The procedures
empower the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS to "inform Member
States of the Mediation and Security Council, and in consultation with
the Chairman, take all necessary and urgent measures.
1 35
Furthermore, Article 27(b) provides that the Mediation and
Security Council (MSC) "shall consider several options and decide on
the most appropriate course of action to take in terms of intervention."
' 136
Nothing in the entire provision of this Article makes reference to an
133 Sierra Leone Web, News Archives, (Sept. 21, 2000), at http://www.sierTa-leone.org/slnews
0900.html.
134 Protocol, supra note 4, at 245.
135 Id.
136Id.
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invitation by the Host State or any other conflicting party as a sine qua
non for ECOWAS intervention. Significant too is the first part of the
latter provision that the MSC shall consider several options. This could
very well be interpreted to mean that the MSC is not bound on a
particular course of action, for instance, such that the affected state may
particularly favor. Apart from that, it appears that the MSC is the main
originator of the process of intervention in contradistinction from
traditional peacekeeping where the government of the Host State is
expected to ask for or accept an offer of assistance from outsiders.
The legal ramification of this provision raises fundamental
questions about regional interventions and the law of peacekeeping.
Prima facie, this provision transforms ECOWAS into a super
organization which is not only competent to intervene in the affairs of
member states, but is entirely at liberty to decide on when to intervene,
how to intervene, and in which crises it will intervene.
In contrast to Article 27 of the ECOWAS Protocol, Article 16 of
the PMAD, under which ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone (phase
one) was conducted, codified the relatively stable customary rule on
invitation or consent by Host State. That provision states that "when an
external armed threat or aggression is directed against a Member State of
the Community, the Head of State of the country shall send a written
request for assistance to the current Chairman of the Authority of
ECOWAS, with copies to other Members. This request shall mean that
the Authority is duly notified and that the AAFC are placed under a state
of emergency. The Authority shall decide in accordance with the
emergency procedure as stipulated in Article 6. " 137
Although controversy has arisen about whether the invitation
sent by Samuel Doe at the outbreak of the Liberian crisis, or that sent by
Tej an Kabbah to ECOWAS from Guinea, met the formal requirement of
this article,138 it has been observed that the institutional structures of
regional arrangements are not meant to be exclusive. 139 Hence, mere non-
compliance with the strict formality of a procedure, without more, should
not be regarded as invalidating the process in itself, provided, de
137 PMAD, supra note 9.
138 C. GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, 213 (Oxford Univ. Press) (2000)
(noting that "it is clear that the normal decision-making processes of ECOWAS were not followed");
Kofi Oteng Kufor, The Legality of the Intervention in the Liberian Civil War by the Economic
Community of West African States, 5 RADIC 525, 538 (1993) (arguing particularly that "[t]he
decision making process was subverted").
139 Georg Nolte, Restoring Peace by Regional Action, 23 ZAORV 53/3 602, 615 (1993) (Arguing
that "[e]xisting precedents show that the institutional aspects of collective security arrangements are
normally not meant to be exclusive").
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minimis, there is conformity with the fundamental element of the
requirement: that there must be an invitation.
For example, the Arab League operated the Arab Deterrent Force
in Lebanon between 1976 and 1983140 without complying with the
institutional structure provided for by the Treaty of Joint Defense and
Economic Cooperation. Also, the U.N. has always implemented the
provisions of Chapter VII of its Charter without complying with the
procedural mechanism of Article 43.41 It would be incredulous to argue
that such U.N. actions against North Korea and Iraq were invalid simply
because the actions were not implemented by the troops that were
contemplated by Article 43 of the U.N. Charter. Such defects, it is
submitted, are of form not of substance.
However, legally speaking, a distinction is to be made between a
mere non-compliance with the formality of a normative rule and the
absence of the constitutive elements of an action when considering its
validity in international law. In the second phase of the Sierra Leone
crisis, ECOWAS applied a provision that did not require the consent of
conflicting parties before its intervention. The question that arises thus is,
in the aftermath of the ECOWAS Protocol, wither the rule of
peacekeeping on host state consent?
A. Did ECOWAS' new Protocol Terminate the Right of Host State
to Invite Intervention Under International Law?
It is trite that there is no specific provision of the U.N. Charter
that regulates peacekeeping operations whether undertaken by the U.N.
or by regional arrangements. Whereas the legal rules governing
enforcement action are to be found in the U.N. Charter, especially
Chapter VII and Chapter VIII, the 'law' of peacekeeping has evolved
mainly through practice by the U.N., individual states and regional
arrangements.
Through practice, certain constant and pervasive features of
peacekeeping operations have come to be regarded as constituting the
'law' on peacekeeping. These include the principle that peacekeeping
operations cannot be used to affect the outcome of a conflict. This
principle is guaranteed by the requirement that peacekeepers must
140 For an analysis of the role played by Arab League in the Middle East, see I. 0. Pogany, The
Arab League and Regional Peacekeeping, 34 NILR 54, 54-74 (1987) (discussing the Arab Deterrent
Force in Lebanon).
141 The International Court of Justice, in the Certain Expenses Case, observed that such forces have
their legal basis in the U.N. Charter since they were designed "for the fulfilment of one of the stated
purpose of the United Nations." The Court held further that this function created "the presumption
that such action is not ultra vires the Organization." Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962
1.C.J. 151 at 167-168.
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remain, at all times, neutral. They may not intervene in a crisis, except
with the invitation of parties to the crisis,142 or use force except in self-
defense.143 They must remain permanently impartial throughout the
duration of an operation. 144 Although there have been instances when
some or all of these principles have been compromised by peacekeepers,
there is yet a strong consensus among writers and states that these
principles constitute the very foundation of peacekeeping operations.
Although it is true that consent of an affected state and other
parties to a conflict must be sought and obtained by peacekeeping states
before intervening in conflicts, there is no requirement that this consent
must be express or, at all times, prior, to intervention. 14' And while it is
reasonable to expect that consent will precede intervention, state practice
is generally uncertain in this regard, and as such, we cannot rule out
further developments. While a prior invitation is practically desirable and
reduces the risk of abuses and meddlesomeness, this has not been
possible in some circumstances, especially where there are several
parties to a conflict. Therefore, in certain circumstances, the existence of
consent may be inferred and could be obtained after the commencement
of intervention.
In Liberia, the Charles Taylor-led National Patriotic Movement
of Liberia (NPFL) did not give its consent expressly before ECOWAS
deployed its monitoring group (ECOMOG) to Liberia and, in fact,
violently opposed its presence at the early stages. Nevertheless, it
subsequently tolerated ECOWAS, participated in the Yamoussoukro
Accord IV and agreed to a cease-fire among all the parties. This suggests
that, even though the consent of a party to a conflict might not have been
142 Dag Hammarskjold, the U.N. Secretary-General under whose leadership the idea of
peacekeeping operations was hatched, once pointed out to the Advisory Committee of the U.N. that
"the very basis and starting point of this effort (UNEF) was the 'recognition of the General
Assembly of the unlimited sovereign rights of Egypt'." See FRYE, A. A UNITED NATIONS FORCE 15
(date unknown).
143 But see Dan Ciobanu, The Power Of The Security Council To Organize Peace-Keeping
Operations, United Nations Peace-Keeping: LEGAL ESSAYS 19, (A. Cassese, ed., Alphen Aan Den
Rijn: Sijhoff & Noordhooff 1978) (arguing that "the use of force is not entirely excluded from the
carrying out of the peace-keeping operations").
144 See LARRY L FABIAN, SOLDIERS WITHOUT ENEMIES: PREPARING THE UNITED NATIONS FOR
PEACEKEEPING, 16 (Brookings Institution 1971); D. WAINHOUSE, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING
AT THE CROSSROADS, 1 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1973); I. RIKHYE et al, THE THIN BLUE LINE:
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND ITS FUTURE, 10 (Yale Univ. Press 1974); I. RIKHYE , THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PEACEKEEPING, 57 (St. Martin's Press 1984) cited in Pogany, supra note
139, at 57, note 19.
145 See for instance Pogany, supra note 139, at 57, arguing that "in terms of international law, at
least some of these requirements may be unnecessarily restrictive."
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obtained before deployment, it is possible to gain this consent at a later
stage by necessary implication.
Conversely, an expressly or implicitly given consent may be
withdrawn by overt means or by the conduct of one or all the parties to
the disputes. Thus, when Charles Taylor eventually turned its fire on
ECOMOG troops, and later, on the UNOMIL, this clearly indicated a
withdrawal of the implicit consent given by the NPFL by necessary
implication. On the contrary, when confronted with the possible invasion
of his country by Israel, President Abdel Nasser of Egypt expressly
withdrew his consent to the deployment of U.N. troops in the Sinai
area.1
46
However, the scenario in Sierra Leone is much more complex,
and cannot be easily regarded as a case of implicit consent as the one in
Liberia. The truth of the matter is that ECOWAS did not require the
consent of the government of Sierra Leone, or that of any of the other
conflictual parties, when it decided to return to Sierra Leone. The explicit
decision, at the Abuja meeting, to undertake enforcement action overrode
any consideration of consent or invitation. This is because, when an
operation is declared to be an enforcement action, all the principles of
peacekeeping take their leave.
Insofar as Sierra Leone ratified the new protocol,
notwithstanding that it purportedly terminates member states' right to
formally invite ECOWAS to come into their conflict, this new obligation
takes precedence over any customary rule in that respect. Article 26 of
the treaty lists five parties who may initiate an intervention upon the
outbreak of a conflict. These are: the Authority of Heads of State and
Government of ECOWAS, the MSC, a member state, the Executive
Secretary of ECOWAS, and the Organization of African Unity or the
United Nations. 147 It is interesting to note that the only specification in
that article that provides that a member state may request an intervention
does not state that such a member state must be the one on whose
territory the conflict is occurring. Had that been the intention of
ECOWAS, it would have undoubtedly said so in the same vein it stated it
under Article 16 of PMAD. It is contended here that the use of the phrase
Ia member state' in the new protocol as against 'that country' in PMAD
is in line with the overall nature of the treaty. ECOWAS deliberately
frees its passage of intervention in a situation where the Member State,
being a subject of a conflict refuses to invite an intervention. It means
any other member State is not precluded from requesting an intervention.
Thus, it is not implausible to conclude that ECOWAS member
states have conceded to ECOWAS the sole authority to decide for them
146 W. DURCH, THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING: CASE STUDIES AND COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS, 124 (St. Martin's Press 1993).
147 Protocol, supra note 4, at 245.
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when to intervene in their intra and inter state conflicts and the means by
which it will intervene.
It is submitted further that it is not an aberration in international
law for states to bind themselves to this kind of obligation,
notwithstanding the apparent effect such might have on their sovereignty.
Legal writers of note have expressed the opinion that "the right of
intervention may arise as a result of a treaty by which one state,
expressly or by implication, consents to intervention for certain purposes
by another state. 148 Sierra Leone did, not only agree under the new
Protocol that ECOWAS could come into its territory in the manner
already discussed, it also agreed to pre-determined occasions that might
lead to such interventions. These are the circumstances enumerated in
Article 25 of the Protocol as constituting the casu foederis for ECOWAS
action. 14 Thus, by agreeing in advance that ECOWAS may intervene in
certain times in specific crises affecting member states, these states
waive their 'customary' right to specifically invite ECOWAS
intervention in terms of crises.
It is contended that no rule of international law governing
peacekeeping operations forbids the coming together of member states of
an international organization for the purpose of giving to the organization
in advance, and collectively, a privilege or right they are legally able to
give to it individually and when the need arises.
It seems entirely credible that the provision of Article 27, which
relates to the procedural application of the Protocol, culminated from
ECOWAS' previous practice in Liberia and its experience in the first
phase of the Sierra Leone crisis. Thus, it is a perfect instance in which
treaty provisions developed from customary international law. The
constant practice by ECOWAS intervening in the affairs of member
states, with or without clear invitation, would appear to have matured
into a situation in which its position as having the de facto authority to
intervene in West African crises is now a fait accompli. The evolution of
customs into treaty law is an affirmation of Anthony D'Amato's
observation that "if treaties generate customary rules when they come
into force, treaties do not "freeze" such customary rules forever. Rather
148 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 446 (9th ed. 1992).
149 This article provides that the Protocol shall apply "(a) in cases of aggression or conflict in any
Member State or threat thereof; (b) In case of conflict between two or several Member States; (c) In
case of internal conflict: (i) that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster, or (ii) that poses a
serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region; (d) In the event of an overthrow or attempted
overthrow of a democratically elected government; (f) Any other situation as may be decided by the
Mediation and Security Council. Protocol, supra note 4, at 244.
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new customary rules may arise out of the practice of states, and these
new rules may alter the previous treaty-generated rules." 50
B. Did Sierra Leone and Other ECOWAS States Forever Bind
Themselves to ECOWAS Sole Discretion on Intervention in their
Affairs?
The next issue that arises for determination is whether, under the
new regime, ECOWAS member states perpetually bind themselves by
consenting in advance to ECOWAS' intervention in their conflicts.
Article 27 of the Protocol seems to warrant an affirmative answer to this
question. Indeed, since there is no requirement of any form of invitation
in the article, it would appear that the act of consenting in advance by
ECOWAS' member states has curtailed their right to decline an
intervention by ECOWAS in their conflicts.
The rationale for the non-inclusion of the requirement of
invitation or consent in the Protocol indicates that Member States may
not terminate ECOWAS missions in their conflicts at will, or prevent its
intervention upon the outbreak of violence. Often, it is difficult to obtain
consents from all parties to a conflict. Somalia is a classical example of
this. General Farah Aideed refused to give his consent and opposed the
intervention by the U.N. from the outset. Furthermore, despite the claim
by ECOWAS that it was invited by Samuel Doe into Liberia, the fact that
ECOWAS did not obtain the consent of the de facto ruler of Liberia at
the relevant time, Charles Taylor, cast a long shadow over the legality of
that action. In addition, even where consent of all parties is obtained
before deployment of troops, sustaining the consent to the very end of
the conflict is quite problematic. In the Suez Canal crisis, UNEF pulled
out because Egypt withdrew its consent.
ECOWAS was clearly unwilling to subject its ability to police its
hemisphere to the whims and caprices of conflictual parties who cannot
always be expected to be enthusiastic of ECOWAS' intervention bid.
Experience in Liberia, where Charles Taylor's NPFL and Sierra Leone
where the RUF consistently opposed ECOWAS actions means that rebel
factions will always use their consent as a trump card whenever
ECOWAS chooses a path different from their dictates. Apart from that,
obtaining consent in advance will go a long way in helping ECOWAS to
deal not only with conflictual parties, but also certain of its member
states acting against their collective decision. In the Liberia crisis for
instance, C6te d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso were alleged to be acting
against the collective interest of the organization by siding with the
rebels.151 During the Liberia crisis these countries did not consent to
150 A. D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AJIL 516, 523
(1993).
151 Communiqu6, supra note 33.
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ECOWAS action although they did not explicitly oppose it. With
advance consent in place, it is legally difficult for states to prevent
ECOWAS intervention by withholding their consents, except, of course,
if such is implemented at the level of the Authority decision.
Nevertheless, it is yet difficult to argue that when ECOWAS
member states ratified the new protocol in November 1999 they, for all
intents and purposes, intended to bind themselves forevermore to
ECOWAS' sole authority to intervene in members' conflicts. Article 91
of the Revised treaty of ECOWAS states that "Any Member State
wishing to withdraw from the Community shall give to the Executive
Secretary one year's notice in writing who shall inform Member States
thereof. At the expiration of this period, if such notice is not withdrawn,
such a State shall cease to be a member of the Community." In
accordance with this provision, a member State not willing to accept
ECOWAS intervention in a conflict occurring within its territory, or
between it and another state, is legally able to withdraw from the
Organization. Upon such withdrawal, ECOWAS cannot legally intervene
in such conflict even if it threatens the peace and security of the region.
The provision of Article 91 however raises one practical
problem. The duration between the serving of a notice and the notice
maturing into an effective withdrawal is one year. A notice served is thus
not effective until after the expiration of this period. Could ECOWAS
then continue its plan to intervene, or its intervention, in a conflict
affecting a member state which has served a withdrawal notice under that
article, but which notice has not matured into an effective withdrawal?
The question is answered by the second paragraph of Article 91. This
states that "[d]uring the period of one year referred to in the preceding
paragraph, such a Member State shall continue to comply with the
provisions of this Treaty and shall remain bound to discharge its
obligation under this Treaty."
This provision is extremely significant concerning the inquiry
whether ECOWAS states perpetually bind themselves to the obligation
to entertain intervention by the organization in their conflicts. Article
91(2) binds member states to their obligations under the ECOWAS
constituent treaty of 1975 as revised. The Protocol was adopted in
conformity with the provisions of Article 58 of the constituent treaty of
ECOWAS, which imposes an obligation of the nature in question on
member states.152 Thus, the obligation incurred under the constituent
treaty extends to the obligation assumed under the subsequent treaties. In
152 Article 58 of the Revised Treaty states that "member States undertake to work to safeguard and
consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security within their
region. In pursuit of these objectives, member States undertake to co-operate with the Community in
establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of
intra-State and inter-State conflicts." Revised Treaty, supra note 1.
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addition, the terms of Article 91(2) are mandatory and not open to the
discretion of member states. It states that such a member state shall
continue to comply with the provisions and shall remain bound to
discharge its obligation under the treaty. Although it may prove
practically difficult for ECOWAS to be able to enforce the terms of this
provision against a state that has served a notice of withdrawal on the
organization, this does not affect the import of that provision. During the
pendency of the notice to withdraw, a state is theoretically bound to
accept ECOWAS intervention.
The Rules of Procedure of the Mediation and Security Council153
may, in practice, become the only procedural solution to the problem of
member states which are unwilling to remain bound to their obligation
under the Protocol. By virtue of Article 34 of the Rules, "a member of
the Security Council may move that the consideration of [a] matters be
postponed." This provision however only avails a state which is a
member of the MSC. Where a reluctant state is not a member of the
MSC, it may act to stop the consideration of a proposal to intervene in its
conflict under Article 30 of the Rules. Under this article,
Where an objection is recorded on behalf of a member State to a
proposal submitted for the decision of the Security Council, the proposal
shall, unless such objection is withdrawn, be referred by the
Ambassadors to the Ministerial meeting and to the meeting of Heads of
State and Government if emanating from a meeting of Ministers.
Thus, it is submitted that notwithstanding the stringent terms of
Article 91(2), a member state which is unwilling to accept an
intervention by ECOWAS in its conflict may prevent such intervention
by raising a preliminary objection before the proposal is considered by
the MSC. Should the latter fail to resolve the matter, a final recourse is to
be had to the Authority of Heads of States and Government on which the
head of state of the concerned state sits whether or not his or her state is a
member of the MSC.
In Sierra Leone, for example, the government was able to
regulate the activities of ECOWAS and UNOMSIL through letters issued
by its president to the Security Council demarcating the responsibilities
of the two organizations on its soil. Had Sierra Leone had any reason to
reject ECOWAS intervention, it would either have expressly said so
during the ECOWAS summit that preceded its return to Sierra Leone, or
would have served a withdrawal notice under Article 91 of the new
protocol which had entered into effect at the relevant time. While it is
admitted that the procedures by which a reluctant state may wriggle out
off what looks like a perpetual obligation under the new protocol, it is
submitted that the matter would be resolved procedurally.
153 On file with author.
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CONCLUSION
The joint implementation of Resolution 1270 by UNAMSIL and
ECOMOG forces highlights the many problems that attend to this kind
of action. One lesson the Sierra Leone experiment does teach is that the
last is yet to be seen as to the development of new trends by regional
arrangements. It seems appropriate thus to observe that it is too early in
the day to arrive at definitive conclusions about the nature of relationship
between the U.N. and regional organizations. It should not always be
assumed, as most analysts of regional collective security tend to do, that
once the U.N. peacekeepers are afield and are joined by the forces of a
regional organization, then the collective security equation is
automatically tantamount to a peacekeeping action. It is urged that each
action, each operation that involves two or more organizations should be
assessed in accordance with the particular facts and dynamics of the case.
A generic assumption about joint operations may obliterate evolving
trends as Sierra Leone clearly demonstrates.
The U.N. Charter codifies, amongst other things, the laws of
armed conflict and use of force. States implement those laws. It is this
implementation of these laws that is referred to as collective security.
Whilst states incur certain obligations under the Charter, the Charter has
not carved how states may apply its laws in stone. The Charter is an
evolutionary document with ample life in its lungs still. States, through
their practice, must make meaning out of Charter provisions. Whilst a
single act by a regional arrangement may not constitute an acceptable
departure from the Charter norm, a recurrent pattern of events, even by a
single regional arrangement may be signaling a new trend in how states
perceive a particular provision of the U.N. Charter.
The Charter prescribes, but states apply. In this application,
states have their own assessment of the Charter laws, as to their
adequacy or otherwise to specific scenarios. When states perceive the
need, they adopt other treaties which may complement the Charter or
depart from it. ECOWAS did. Whether one perceives the ECOWAS
Protocol as complementing or departing from the Charter is up to
individual assessment. But what is undoubted is that the provisions of
that treaty signal a new development in the law and practice of regional
collective security.
The U.N. must adjust to new trends in the regional collective
security system. Obstinate adherence to classical notions could only lead
to further complexities. Peacekeeping developed because the centralized
collective security machinery of the Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
could not be realized. Since the end of the Cold War, the world has
witnessed a momentous involvement of regional arrangements in
collective security. Can the U.N., then, afford to stay faithful to classical
notions of peacekeeping, which evolved in response to the circumstances
of the 1950s?
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. VOL. 10
In Sierra Leone, the U.N. stuck to a peacekeeping mandate in a
situation where there was no peace to keep. Yet, it accepted to work in
conjunction with an organization which is committed to enforcement
action. Divergent mandates are a recipe for disaster. The relationship
between UNAMSIL and ECOMOG attests to that much. Unclear regime
of command and control in joint missions is all that is required for the
forces to pull in different directions. If there was any lesson the U.N.
must learn from this so-called joint-peacekeeping, it is that in reality the
action was neither joint nor a substantial part of it peacekeeping.
The law of peacekeeping develops through the practice of its
practitioners. Regional arrangements are one of the most legitimate
practitioners of peacekeeping. ECOWAS pioneered joint-peacekeeping
operations. It is undoubtedly one of the most active regional
arrangements since the end of the Cold War. As such, its recent trends-
a wider conception of peace and security, broader framework of
collective security, and a new approach to the rules of peacekeeping-
will most likely influence how operations by regional arrangements must
be viewed and evaluated in international law henceforth. It is our view
that the future of the relationship between the U.N. and regional
organization does not lie in the perception that the Charter obligations
are immutable, but that a harmonious modus operandi can be worked out
between the two organizations, even if they must occasionally or at all
times operate under different legal regimes.
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Sierra Leone's "Conflict Diamonds": The Legacy of Imperial
Mining Laws and Policy
Ian Martinez*
Introduction1
A common misconception is that the current civil war in Sierra
Leone is the result of illicit diamond mining. True, diamonds were the
fuel of the latest flare-up of fighting. Illicit diamond digging emerged
simultaneously with the discovery of alluvial diamonds in the country.
The British, unwilling to pay for the costs of patrolling or controlling the
hinterland-where diamonds are found-sought a colonial compromise.
Their policy was twofold: a) to institute indirect rule through the
traditional paramount chiefs and b) to use a tributary system whereby
miners received a share of diamonds they recovered in lieu of wages.
Eventually this system degraded government rule and led to a rise in
corruption. The efforts to control the illicit diamond led, in time, to the
rise of a "shadow state."2 The colonial governance planted the current
mindset that infects Sierra Leone like a malignant tumor. The patient
lived, infused with donor medicine as its lifeblood, diamonds, were
sucked away. Finally, the 1990s saw the tumor explode into an orgy of
violence. This article explores the genesis of the illicit diamond trade and
the continuation of that policy after independence.
I. Colonial Development
A. Early History and British West African Policy
The British settled the area now known as Freetown as a
settlement for freed slaves in 1787. Freetown, "province of freedom" was
the site of missionaries and a university-Fourah Bay College,
established in 1827. While the coastal settlement flourished, the colonial
government was unwilling to enter the interior and establish their control
over it. In 1898 the Hut Tax War erupted against British rule and
taxation. After the treaties and a pacifying war, the British solidified their
position in Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, in a tacit recognition of their
incomplete domination of the interior of the colony, colonial officials
sought to co-opt the interior chiefs and assign them various tasks.3
*(J.D.) University of Miami School of Law; 2002; U.M. Int'l & Comp. L. R., Editor-In-Chief;
(M.A.) Florida International University; (B.A.) Temple University; former Intelligence Officer with
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency covering Africa. I want to dedicate this article to my wife and
new born daughter, Isabella. All errors in this article are mine.
1 For another view on the Sierra Leone conflict, please see the preceding.-Eds.
2 See WILLIAM RENO, CORRUPTION AND STATE POLITICS IN SIERRA LEONE, 29 (1995); JOHN
HIRSCH, SIERRA LEONE: DIAMONDS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY, 23 (200 1).
3 Id.
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British Imperial policy in Africa had two forms of government:
a) colonies under traditional local rulers such as chiefs; and b) colonies
of white European settlement overseen by British administrators.4 The
first was representative of most of West Africa, the latter of places like
Kenya, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia. Yet, in Sierra Leone the
British initiated a dualistic approach to governance. Chiefs governed the
interior of the country, and Freetown was governed by Creoles, overseen
by British colonial administrators.
In line with their policy and in recognition of their inability to
exercise full control of the interior, the British sought an accommodation
with the country's chiefs. The British aimed to support a stable class of
intermediaries-the tribal chiefs of the interior of the country-who
would promote internal stability and colonial efficiency at a low cost.
Ten percent of the population in Kono lived in servitude to the chiefs. "It
was the chiefs, not Freetown, who exercised direct control over the
protectorate's population."5 To further save money, the chiefs were even
given control of their own police force in 1921 6
The interior of the colony was still a "malaria-infested swamp"
in the 1920s. Young colonial officers were sent to Sierra Leone, with the
hope of transferring out as quickly as possible. As a result they turned a
blind eye to informal appropriations of state resources and illegal
activities in return for assurances from chiefs and others to maintain the
peace.7 This further led to indiscriminate acts by chiefs who knew local
or London officials would not question their actions.
As the British built up their presence in the interior of the
country through colonial officers, London worried about administrative
costs and the colony's chronic fiscal shortfalls. To exploit Sierra Leone
economically and to pay for the growing costs of colonizing the interior,
the British colonial government began a systematic routine geological
survey in 1926. The survey led to the discovery of several mineral
deposits in 1927. In 1927 the Minerals Ordinance Act vested control over
mineral rights in Sierra Leone upon the British Crown.8 Digging by
Africans for minerals was made illegal. 9 The colonial government
envisioned no role for Sierra Leoneans, other than laborers for British
mining companies who would have monopolies over all minerals. 10 In
January 1930, the Sierra Leone Geological Survey Department
4 P.J. MARSHALL, THE CAMBRIDGE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 102 (1996).
5 Reno, supra note 1, at 44.
6 Reno, supra note 1, at 37.
7 See id. at 31.
8 See Laws of Sierra Leone, Minerals Ordinance, Vol. IV Chapter 196, 1 (Jan. 1, 1960).
9 See id. at 2.
10 See Reno supra note 2, at 47.
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announced to the world and to the British Empire, that alluvial diamonds
had been discovered in Sierra Leone's southeast Kono District." The
discovery would be a blessing and curse for the people of Sierra Leone.
The Selection Trust Ltd., a London-based holding company with
investments in mining copper, zinc, diamonds, and gold, formed
Consolidated African Selection Trust Ltd. (CAST) in 1922 for the sole
purpose of mining in British West Africa, particularly in Sierra Leone.
Selection Trust Ltd., held a controlling interest in CAST, with the other
shares held by De Beers and the public. In March 1931 CAST led a
second diamond expedition into Sierra Leone's Kono district. CAST
reconfirmed the original discovery and found more deposits. CAST then
immediately applied for an Exclusive Prospecting License (EPL) from
the Colonial Office in London.12 In what would be a nominal policy of
vesting control of mining to successive concessionaries or parastatals for
the next 50 years, on June 1, 1932 CAST was given an EPL from the
Colonial Office. The EPL covered 4,170 square miles of territory inside
Sierra Leone. In return, CAST was to pay rent, a five percent export tax,
and a five percent profits tax to the Colonial Administrators in
Freetown. 13
The government's decision to extend the SLST lease to include
the whole country coincided with a shift in colonial macro-economic
policy. From 1850 until 1932 the British Empire was governed by free
trade. But in 1932, the British introduced protectionism to the Empire in
response to the Great Depression. Raw materials and food shipped to
Britain were exempt from high tariffs meant to block out non-imperial
trade. 14 Colonies were thus encouraged to focus on one commodity and
to ship it to the Imperial metropolis for processing.
One advantage of a corporate mining monopoly was that it
possessed the legal means to control illicit indigenous mining since the
colonial government did not have, nor would London provide, the
resources to eradicate it.'" To control illicit mining, SLST made informal
payments to any chief who agreed to withhold settler rights and control
migration in Kono. Restricting settlements in the area meant fewer
people would be outside the control of the chiefs or inclined to mine
11 GREENHALGH, PETER, WEST AFRICAN DIAMONDS 1919-1983: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY 47
(1985); TIMOTHY GREEN, THE WORLD OF DIAMONDS 113 (1981) (Alluvial diamonds form the bulk
of world-wide diamonds and are found over large land areas where they have been scattered by
ancient rivers).
12 Id. at 60.
13 See id. at 49.
14 See Marshall supra note 4, at 112.
15 See Reno supra note, 2 at 48.
219
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. VOL. 10
illegally. A single British company similarly monopolized the iron ore
industry. Both companies refused to publish their profits.
16
B. The SLST Diamond Monopoly
By 1933 more discoveries were made which hastened a second
EPL application and introduced the possibility of a countrywide
monopoly over diamond mining. In 1935 the Sierra Leone Colonial
Legislative Council granted CAST exclusive mining, exploration,
production, marketing, and prospecting rights in the colony for a period
of 99 years. 17 In exchange, CAST would create a new company, which
would be the actual vested owner of the rights, pay a yearly rent of
£7000, and pay 27.5 percent of net profits to the colonial government of
Sierra Leone which would be used for indigenous purposes." The Sierra
Leone Selection Trust Ltd. (SLST) was formed in April 1934 with CAST
holding all the shares.19
Since alluvial diamonds are scattered in wide areas, they
therefore require mechanized equipment to move massive tones of gravel
to sift for meager carats. In order to exploit those alluvial diamonds,
mechanization was introduced in 1935 to sift faster. This is one reason
why the Colonial Office may have opted for an international firm with
the financial backing to purchase and import the heavy machinery
required to move large amounts of earth.
C. The Relationship Between SLST & Local Africans
The relationship between SLST and the local Africans was rocky
from the start. Although SLST paid surface rent to the Colonial Tribal
Authorities, the amount was trivial. SLST did compensate local Africans
for the destruction of any housing, crops, or sacred ritual sites caused by
mining operations.2" But the money paid was nowhere near the profits
being raked in. Local Africans soon realized the value of this precious
mineral and began to illegally mine near the SLST sites. Since mining by
local Africans was illegal, SLST turned to the colonial administrators to
further curtail this lucrative operation. In 1931, SLST pressed for
legislation limiting Africans' access and right to deal in diamonds. By
16 H.L. VAN DER LAAN, THE SIERRA LEONE DIAMONDS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY COVERING THE
YEARS 1952-1961 54 (1965).
17 See Laws of Sierra Leone: Diamond Agreements and License (Ratification), Vol. IV, Ch. 196
(Jan. 1, 1960); I. Smillie et al., The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human
Security (2000), available at http://www.web.net/pac/pacnet-1/msgOO09.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2001).
18 See Grennhalgh, supra note 11, at 52; BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES, SIERRA LEONE: THE
MAKING OF A NATION 15 (1960).
19 See Grennhalgh, supra note 11, at 48; BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES, supra note 18, at 15.
20 See Grennhalgh, supra note 11, at 109.
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the mid-1930s, illegal African digging was sapping revenue in the EPL
and lowering SLST's contribution to colonial coffers.21 In 1934, in
response to these events, possession of diamonds by persons other than
members of SLST was made illegal.22 In a prelude of the 1990s and the
use of private armies, by 1935, the SLST had established its own
Diamond Protection Force to guard against thefts and illegal diamond
23mining.
Sir Ernest Oppenheimer seized the reins of De Beers (the
diamond empire of Cecil Rhodes, eponymous founder of Rhodesia and
of the prestigious Rhodes Scholarships) in 1929-mere months before
the U.S. stock market crash. Demand for diamonds had decreased
significantly because of the Great Depression. Several mines were closed
in South Africa, and the Oppenheimer family was seeking lower
production in Africa, particularly in Sierra Leone. The SLST balked, but
other events soon forced the company to rethink its policies. In 1938
Ernest Oppenheimer found himself with no place to market his wares.
Rather than risk a plunge in the status and price of diamonds, he sent his
29-year-old son, Harry, from Johannesburg, South Africa, to New York
to meet with the N.W. Ayer advertising agency. The plan was to
transform America's taste for small, low-quality stones into a luxury
market taste that would absorb the excess production of higher quality
gems that were no longer selling in Europe. N.W. Ayer saw the
challenge as one requiring a solid grasp of mass psychology, and
consequently, Ayer meticulously researched the attitudes of American
men and women about romance and gift giving. From this research, the
slogan "A Diamond Is Forever" was born. Ayer and De Beers launched
the most sophisticated marketing campaign known to the world, which
equated one's love to the size of a diamond. The resulting diamond sales
in the United States of America (U.S.) managed to keep the diamond
industry afloat.
In 1939 war broke out in Europe and the non-industrial diamond
market all but collapsed. The U.S. was the sole market for diamond sales.
Profits fell as labor shortages and a lack of spare parts led to rising
operating costs. 24 As a result of these inefficiencies, production fell even
further and revenues into the colonies' coffers suffered accordingly.
D. Post World War II & the Road to Independence
After World War II (WWII), African participation in the mining
industry rose dramatically. This can be traced to: first, the ease of mining
in alluvial plains without making large investments; second, the
21 See id. at 152.
22 See BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES supra note 17, at 15.
23 See Hirsch supra note 2, at 27
24 See Grennhalgh, supra note 11, at 55.
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loosening of colonial and foreign control over mining; third, the rise in
diamond prices following World War II; and fourth, returning African
soldiers and their increased desire for colonial independence.
25
As far as control over mining went, the new Labour government
in Britain instituted a new policy for the colonies. Labour wanted to see
flourishing colonial economies upon which self-government could be
built. Labour also wanted the colonies to increase commodity production
in order to earn hard currency for the metropolis before independence.2 6
These colonial commodities would outlast the Empire and bind those
newly independent nations to the markets in Britain. Colonial officials
were instructed to bring Africans directly into the modem economy and
to take a more direct role in shaping the colonial economies in order to
meet that goal.27
The third reason Africans began to mine diamonds was the
soaring costs of diamonds. The U.S. accounted for most of the
consumption. With the demobilization of U.S. forces following WWII
and the increase in post-war marriages, the diamond market rebounded.
As Europe recovered from the war, De Beers turned to the reconquest of
its old market.
Finally, returning African Commonwealth soldiers soon
discovered the true price of diamonds, according to an African dealer in
Sierra Leone: "It was not until our brothers, who had been traveling in
the war, came back and told us they were worth much money that we
started looking [at them] .,,28 Africans, who wanted self-determination as
recompense for their participation in fighting for the Allied cause, also
wanted a piece of mining operations. This increased self-awareness led
Africans to challenge the SLST's monopoly. Returning soldiers soon
increased pressure at all levels, and the early 1950s were pivotal years
for their actions and demands. The African-led Sierra Leone Legislative
Council forced the diamond and iron ore companies to publish their
profits for the first time in 1952.
The local Africans continued their relentless pressure, and in late
1952, the Legislative Council-controlled by Freetown's Creoles-went
to Britain to renegotiate the terms of SLST's and DELCO's iron-ore
monopolistic agreements. A new combination tax, the Income and
Diamond Industry Profit Tax, was introduced. The tax placed a 60
percent levy on diamond profits and repealed the former Income tax of
45 percent. The rise in taxation was offset by a reduction of British
25 See id. at 25.
26 See Marshall supra note 4, at 90.
27 See Reno supra note 2, at 56.
28 See Grennhalgh, supra note 11, at 114.
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corporate taxes on both companies. 29 As SLST's control lapsed, illegal
diamond mining increased with deleterious consequences.
Sierra Leone's food scarcity problems in the 1950s illustrated the
flaw in colonial economics. The capital, Freetown (which was receiving
generous development funds from the Labour government), was at the
mercy of the interior food-producing areas. In 1952, crop failures
devastated eastern Sierra Leone. Without food to cultivate, many turned
to elicit digging to supplement their earnings.30 As word spread about the
lucrativeness of illegal mining, teachers, public service workers and
other laborers left their jobs to try their luck in digging.3 Agriculture,
construction, trade, and the transportation industries were all affected by
the transfer of labor. Soon, prices rose for basic commodities as
thousands left the cities to mine. The rice market-the main staple crop
-collapsed in 1954 due to crop failures and farmers leaving their fields
to dig for diamonds. Rice prices soon rose beyond the reach of laborers
in Freetown, and in February 1955, food rioting broke out. In 1955, a
group of miners also stormed the SLST security forces and police station.
The riots underscored the economic upheaval caused by the massive
transfer of labor resources from the agricultural sector and other vital
industries to illegal diamond mining. To stem the flow of skilled urban
workers and rural farmers to the fields in Kono, the colonial government
responded by raising skilled and semi-skilled wages by 20 percent.
The turmoil of the early 1950s led to a sharp increase in illegal
African diggers.32 The presence of so many illicit diggers increased their
share of production. African diggers smuggled out illicit diamonds
through Liberia, robbing the SLST of its stock and the Colonial
government of revenue. Corruption by the interior police, who were
controlled by the chiefs, led to increased illegal digging. According to a
British Mining Executive, "anything can be fixed with a little 'dash'
(bribe); this is the land of the waving palms."33 In 1954, SLST dove into
co-opting the chiefs by providing them payoffs to control illicit mining.
The company began making unauthorized payments to chiefs for
"development purposes," provided security for the chiefs, and extended
loans to them for cars and building materials. Soon the local chiefs were
wielding immense economic and political power. These efforts
undermined the colonial government's efforts to regulate the diamond-
mining sector and to stamp out corruption in the waning days of the
colony.34
29 See Van der Laan supra note 16, at 4.
30 See British Information Services supra note 17, at 15.
31 See Van der Laan supra note 16, at 9.
32 See id. at 9.
33 See Green supra note 11, at 114.
34 See Reno supra note 2, at 65.
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In 1954, legislation to limit African digging, which was already
illegal, was supported by African Ministers who had been running Sierra
Leone's internal affairs since 1951. A detachment of the Sierra Leone
Police Force was sent to augment the Diamond Protection Force of the
SLST. The SLST began constructing security posts, manned by the
SLST force on important sites.35 After the riots in Freetown, the number
of illicit African diggers rose to nearly 40,000 and their share of
diamonds increased from around 200,000 carats in 1952 to some 2
million carats in 1956.36
In 1955, growing government sensitivities and African pressure
forced the SLST to reduce its exclusive mining rights to an area of just
230 square miles for thirty years.3 7 SLST's 99-year monopoly was finally
crushed. SLST received £1,570,000 in compensation from the colony for
the confiscated lands. 38 The colonial administrators granted local miners
the right to engage in legalized small mining operations.
In 1956, the Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme (ADMS),
composed of the Alluvial Diamond Mining Rules, the Alluvial Diamond
Mining Ordinance, and other legislation, was passed.39 ADMS made all
previously illicit African mining areas into licensed areas. As a result,
Africans could legally mine for the first time since 1927 when mineral
possession by Africans was criminalized. 40 The ADMS, although
amended several times, still forms the basis of licensed digging in Sierra
Leone today. The digging licenses last for about six months, but there are
provisions for one- or five-year licenses. 4' The licenses can be issued to
either Sierra Leoneans or firms in which they have a majority
ownership.42 The filing fees were set low, about £9 for a yearly license in
1956. The digger has to pay additional fees to the tribal authorities,
called surface rents, which usually were about £10 a year. In addition,
the Ordinance established a diamond buying organization and a system
35 See Van der Laan supra note 16, at 57.
36 IRVING KAPLAN, et al., AREA HANDBOOK FOR SIERRA LEONE, 305 (Foreign Area Studies -
American University, 1976).
37 See Sierra Leone Diamond Agreement, Ch. 210 (1955); Greenhalgh, supra note 11, at 57;
PACNET, supra note 17.
38 British Information Services, supra note 18, at 16.
39 See Sierra Leone Alluvial Diamond Mining Ordinance, Ch. 198 (1956); Diamond Industry
Protection Ordinance, Ch. 199 §3(2) (1956).
40 See supra. Ch. 198, at § 4(1); Habib v. Attorney-General, 1957-60 ALR S.L. 24 (Sierra Leone
Sup. Ct. 1957) (illegal trading in diamonds abrogated by Alluvial Diamond Mining Ordinance).
41 See Van der Laan supra note 16, at 67; Alluvial Diamond Mining Ordinance, supra note 38, at §3
(2).
42 See Van der Laan supra note 16, at 71; Kaplan, supra note 36, at 305; PACNET, supra note 17.
In 1956, it was estimated that 75,000 illicit miners were in the Kono District alone.
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for exporting diamonds-which in 1959 became the sole exporter of
diamonds-under license from the government. 43 Diggers were also
allowed to sell diamonds to the Diamond Corporation, an affiliate of De
Beers. Penalties were set for those who were not licensed or possessed
illegally mined diamonds.44 In 1956, the Diamond Industry Protection
Ordinance was passed, requiring that strangers (non-residents of the
Kono District) obtain a license to settle in the Diamond Protection
Areas.45 Nonetheless, some 40,000 foreigners (Lebanese, Guineans, and
others) were removed from Kono and driven out by the colonial
government.46
But as always, colonial officials were weary of spending money
on equalizing the playing field for Africans. London would not pay for
what it preached. To implement this new licensing scheme, the colonial
officials turned once again to the chiefs-the true middlemen in the
country. Kono chiefs approved licenses, assigned lands for mining, and
collected surface rent. The only individuals with enough money to
purchase the diamond licenses were Lebanese businessmen and
Freetown Creoles. These two groups once again alienated the inclusion
of Africans in the new post-monopoly economy. A Kono businessman
complained that unofficial payments to chiefs increased 500% as a result
of the chief s authority under the licensing scheme.47
These moves were meant to supply a steady stream of revenue
into the Sierra Leonean treasury, to provide jobs, and to minimize the
depletion of diamonds. Economic development flowed through the now
regulated industry. Markets were built and communications were
improved and shopkeepers did brisk business.48 The new regulations and
tightening of security led to smugglers leaving to Liberia and creating a
conduit for diamonds through that country.4 9 In order to work in
conjunction with African diggers, the SLST introduced contract mining
on its lands in 1959. °
43 See British Information Services supra note 18, at 16; Alluvial Diamond Mining Ordinance,
supra note 36, at Ch. 198 §9.
44 See Alluvial Diamond Mining Ordinance supra note 38, at Ch. 198 §18(1-4), §21, §24(1).
45 See Diamond Industry Protection Ordinance supra note 36, at Ch. 199 §3(2); Saccoh v.
Commissioner, 1958 ALR S.L. (Sierra Leone Sup. Ct. 1958) (Defendant was not within a diamond
producing area and hence could not be prosecuted under Diamond Industry Protection Ordinance for
being a stranger).
46 See Hirsch supra note 2, at 27
47 See Reno supra note 2 at 63.
48 See Van der Laan supra note 16 at 19.
49 See PACNET supra note 17.
50 See id. at 73; British Information Services, supra note 18, at 16.
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On the eve of independence, diamonds accounted for nearly half
of all domestic imports.51 Sierra Leone left the 1950s on its way towards
independence. Nonetheless, the British, in their final days, did little to
dispel the economically powerful chiefs, the inequities of poverty, and
the lucrativeness of illegal mining. Within the colonial government, there
were doubts about the post-independence viability of the colony.52 The
question seemed to be whether Sierra Leone would be blown away by
the "winds of change" sweeping Africa.
II. Post-Independence, a Continuation of British Policy:
Government Policy from 1961 to the Stevens Years.
A. Government Meddling Begins
On 27 April 1961, Sierra Leone, led by Freetown's Creoles,
became the third British dependency in West Africa to gain
independence. The Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) was the first
governing party. The SLPP was controlled by the Mende ethnic group
and supported by the Creoles from Freetown who wished to continue the
traditional role of chiefs in the economy. 3 At independence time, Sierra
Leoneans were invited to join the boards of both DELCO and SLST.
The first economic crisis for the new government started before
independence in January 1961. From 1932 to 1960, SLST earned hard
currency by selling its diamonds to the De Beers controlled CSO. CAST,
the parent company of SLST, and the CSO negotiated the contracts in
five-year periods. In January 1961, SLST did the yet unheard of action of
breaking away from the De Beers' cartel, selling its diamonds to two
American firms. The reason for opting out of the De Beers CSO were the
low prices paid to SLST for diamonds mined.
5 4
The reasons for the clash with De Beers for higher prices are
twofold. First, the ADMS SLST had only a thirty-year contract to mine
the remaining diamonds in its exclusive areas. Thus, it needed to extract
and sell its production as fast as possible. Yet, this was counter to De
Beers' policy of not flooding the market with diamonds. The price of
diamonds remains high because De Beers, through the CSO, buys
diamonds and controls their supply. Without the CSO and the De Beers
marketing campaign of the 1930s, diamonds would be worthless.
Second, African diggers had depleted diamonds at the surface or
had pock-marked the surface of the land to such an extent as to hamper
SLST's heavy equipment from operating properly, forcing SLST to dig
51 See British Information Services supra note 18 at 15.
52 See THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: WHITE MAN'S CONQUEST OF THE DARK
CONTINENT FROM 1876 TO 1912 675 (Random House, 1991).
53 See Kaplan supra note 36, at 174.
54 See Van der Laan supra note 16, at 148.
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deeper and longer for diamonds. No longer could the company simply
search the surface for diamonds. SLST now had to dig deep to recover
diamonds.
The American firms were willing to pay higher prices to
circumvent the CSO. The break meant that Sierra Leone received higher
income taxes from SLST and higher Diamond Industry Profit Taxes.
Nonetheless, in 1962 the SLPP, under pressure from De Beers, passed an
act that required that all diamonds mined by SLST be sold to the
government, who in turn would sell the diamonds to the CSO.5" Rather
than going through De Beers, SLST stopped exporting diamonds
altogether in September 1961.56 Freetown sided with the CSO's estimate
that diamond reserves were not as low as the SLST feared and that it was
more important to have a stable diamond market.57 The SLPP wanted
long-term revenue and jobs rather than a quick infusion of revenue.
SLST refused to budge and continued to withhold its diamonds for
export until January 1963, when a new law was passed. The law allowed
SLST to sell fifty percent to the CSO and the remainder to purchasers
who would be licensed by the government.5 8 SLST released 700,000
carats (a full years' worth of production) in January 1963 as a result of
the new law. 9
B. Trying to Shore up the Economy & the Government
The late 1960s were economically and politically tumultuous for
Sierra Leone. In 1966, GDP declined by 2.1%. Exports dropped in 1965
and 1966 to dangerous levels, exhausting foreign reserves. In October
1966, a stabilization program from the IMF was implemented.60 In 1967,
two steps were taken to reverse the decline in foreign exchange. First, the
SLPP introduced new legislation that raised SLST's tax liability from 60
percent to 70 percent.61 Second, the government devalued the currency,
the Leone.
During the 1967 campaign season the former Minister of Mines,
Stevens, called for the expulsion of SLST altogether.62 In March 1967,
Stevens was victorious at the polls by pledging anything to anybody.
Stevens quickly turned the presence of SLST into a political issue. On
March 23, 1967 the Sierra Leonean army, led by ethnic Mendes,
55 See Act to Control the Marketing of Diamonds Produced in Sierra Leone, Act No. 3 (1962).
56 See Van der Laan supra note 16, at 145.
57 See id. at 151.
58 See Sierra Leone Public Notice No. 79 (July 21, 1962).
59 See Kaplan supra note 36, at 217.
60 See id. at 213.
61 See The Diamond Supplementary Agreement (1967) Ratification Act 1970.
62 See Greenhalgh supra note 11, at 217.
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launched a coup d'&tat, claiming they wanted to halt government
corruption.63 On January 25, 1968, another coup rocked Sierra Leone.
Then on April 18, 1968, the coup was reversed by another coup and
Stevens was allowed to assume power. In November 1968, violence
ripped the capital and was brutally suppressed by Stevens. Sierra Leone's
political and economic house was unraveling by the close of the 1960s.
C. The 1970s: The Deconstruction of the Inherited Colonial
Movement
Stevens wanted to build a political organization capable of
replacing the inherited colonial authority he wished to destroy-the old
Creole elite and the chiefs. To create and reward his new following,
Stevens would dismantle his inherited colonial economy. To do so,
Stevens needed to control the resources of Sierra Leone-diamonds
being foremost-so that he could redistribute through state patronage the
resources to his followers. The nationalization of the SLST would be the
first step and would allow him to control all of the wealth that flowed
from legitimate mining. Stevens would then divert the mining revenue
flow into the state's coffers, where he would exercise direct control.
64
Stevens could then award mining contracts, digging licenses, and money,
as well as appoint positions where necessary. This new economic order
amounted to "Black Colonialism" for the majority of Sierra Leone's
population.65
As his first step, the government took over 51% of the SLST's
shares and changed the name to the National Diamond Mining Company
(DIMINCO) in October 1970.66 The SLST was retained to provide
technical management. Stevens and his right hand-man, a Lebanese
diamond businessman named Jamil Mohammed, now took all
DIMINCO's decisions.67 The creation of DIMINCO allowed Stevens to
award his people with jobs, money and accesses to diamonds.68
Stevens used Lebanese middlemen because they could be
expelled at will due to their foreign status and due to the inherent
unpopularity of the fact that they kept wealth out of the hands of
blacks.69 Stevens' followers, who were mining diamonds, wanted to opt
out of the De Beers purchasing scheme. They quickly found that most
63 See PACNET supra note 17; SAMUEL DECALO, COUPS & ARMY RULE IN AFRICA: MOTIVATIONS
& CONSTRAINTS, 8 (Yale Univ. Press) (1990).
64 See Reno supra note 2, at 88.
65 See id. at 131.
66 See Kaplan supra note 36, at 306; Green, supra note 11, at 116.
67 See PACNET supra note 17.
68 See Reno supra note 2, at 93.
69 See id. at 133.
2001-2002 SIERRA LEONE: "CONFLICT DIAMONDS"
banks, such as Barclays, refused to extend them credit. The only ones
that did were Lebanese banks.
In the 1973 election, the SLPP was intimidated and harassed by
Stevens' followers and militia. The SLPP also saw its newspaper
banned.70 In 1974, another unsuccessful coup was launched. Finally in
1975, Stevens banned all political parties and declared Sierra Leone a
one-party state.
In 1974, Stevens introduced a five-year plan whose major
objectives were to raise the standard of living, provide greater self
sufficiency and diversification, and reduce regional economic
imbalances. The mining of bauxite, ilmenite, and rutile, as well as the
production of rice (the staple crop), were given top priority. 71 From 1973
to 1976 one-third of the total value of DIMINCO's diamond production
went to the government in dividends and income taxes.72 In 1973, the
government shut down DIMINCO's railways, which linked the mines
with Freetown. 73 The rail lines had been poorly maintained since the date
of independence, and by 1974, much of it had been ripped up in portions
74and sold for scrap.
A year after the 1973 election, Stevens granted private diamond
export licenses totaling 20% per annum of the country's total production
to five personal friends. One close friend, Jamil, alone received 12%.
Other friends received the favor of not being required to repatriate
foreign exchange earnings from the overseas sale of diamonds. This
generous exemption from repatriation contributed to chronic foreign
exchange crunches since diamonds were the number one foreign
exchange earner.75 After the installation of Stevens' cronies, revenue
from diamonds dropped, as the cronies skimmed from the top of
DIMINCO, creating a cash shortage of more than 60% by 1976.76
Income Tax collection had also ceased by that time.77 As the economy
contracted, foreign direct investment (FDI) dried up. In 1978, FDI stood
at $102.7 million. By 1983, FDI had fallen to -$26.9 million.78
Official government revenue was needed to maintain
international creditor confidence in the economy, so that foreign loans
70 See Kaplan supra note 36, at 183.
71 ALAN BEST, AFRICAN SURVEY, 189 (Wiley & Sons) (1977).
72 See Kaplan supra note 36, at 306.
73 TROPICAL AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT, 255 (M.B.Gleave ed., Longman Scientific & Technical)
(1992).
74 See id. at 232; Best, supra note 71, at 192.
75 See Reno supra note 2, at 109-1 0.
76 See id. at 95.
77 Id. at 134.
78 Id.
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would continue to come in order to subsidize state industries and benefit
Stevens' cronies. To that end, the government took two steps in 1977 to
increase diamond revenue. First, the government sought to attract more
illegal diamonds into official channels. To accomplish this goal, the
government cut its export duty from 7.5% to 2.5% in 1977. 7 9 Second, the
government sought to end the De Beers controlled Diamond Corp. West
African's (DICORWAF) monopoly and also sought to introduce
additional international buyers to encourage price competition.8"
Although appearing benign, this last measure was intended to benefit
Stevens' cronies as they could now sell diamonds abroad and repatriate
less hard currency. Nonetheless, DICORWAF still bought the majority
of DIMINCO's output.81 Despite all of this, by the late 1970s DIMINCO
was a company in decline. DIMINCO had pruned personnel, halved the
security force, closed some treatment plants, unsuccessfully searched for
new minerals, and reduced capital expenditures.82 By 1977, the SLST-
who had been retained as technical managers-recommended the closure
of some operations."
D. Enter the 1980s and Exit Stevens
In 1981, a general strike, the first since independence, occurred
as a result of worsening economic conditions. In 1984, Fulah Bay
College, in operation since 1814, was closed. Stevens turned to the IMF
and World Bank for help in securing short-term credit. The IMF required
Stevens to privatize many state-run enterprises. The IMF had correctly
recognized that his cronies played a major role in running the state
enterprises.84 The IMF pressured Stevens to adopt austerity measures,
chief of which was ending the subsidy for imported rice.
Domestic rice production, never able to meet the demands of the
country, suffered as government-subsidized imported rice was
introduced. Farmers of cocoa and coffee-the main agricultural exports
-were hard hit because of global price decreases for the commodities.
Rice in Sierra Leone was used as a tool to undermine the power of the
chiefs. Stevens gave out to his cronies distribution rights to foreign-
grown rice. The government bought the rice with credit and then resold it
at subsidized prices to the cronies. The cronies, in turn, distributed the
rice to rural dwellers at a mark-up that was still below the price for
domestically produced rice. The goal of rice distribution was to reward
79 See Green supra note 11, at 119.
80 Id.
81 See Kaplan supra note 36, at 308.
82 See Greenhalgh supra note 11, at 219.
83 See id at 220.
84 See Reno supra note 2, at 138.
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loyal chiefs and to punish those with an independent streak.8" It was this
scheme that the IMF sought to eliminate. It was unsuccessful.
In 1983, an agreement was signed with the SLST and the
government for production of kimberlite diamonds.86 In 1984 the SLST,
the original mining company in Sierra Leone, folded its tent and sold its
remaining shares to Precious Metals Mining Company (PMMC).87 Jamil,
Stevens' right hand man, controlled PMMC. The official diamond sector
was clearly failing and being subsumed by the informal sector, which
had now spun out of control. The state had finally lost control of the
production of diamonds, enabling private entrepreneurs to take over
Kono. The table below illustrates the progression from slide to collapse
of the legitimate diamond industry.
By the time Stevens retired in 1985, he had succeeded in
eliminating the inherited colonial economic order and in creating his
own. His economy thus looked somewhat like the following. Diamonds
were mined by his hand-picked cronies and then sent to Freetown. The
diamonds were exported with the assistance of Lebanese banks. The
diamonds were then used to obtain international credits to be used later
for rice imports, loans, and government patronage. Next, rice and other
goods were imported and distributed in order to co-opt chiefs at the local
level. Thus, the dissolution of the old system was complete. Stevens'
cronies, Lebanese businessmen and local chiefs, effectively marginalized
the Creoles. Stevens' last years in power, 1981-86, saw the GDP per
capita annual growth rate contract by -2.1% and the industrial growth
rate contract by -3.5%.88
E. The Slippery Slope to Collapse and De-Industrialization
Joseph Momah became Prime Minister following Stevens'
retirement in 1985. Momah gave Jamil direct control of DIMINCO.
Jamil, the Lebanese businessman with ties to Lebanese militiamen
fighting in Lebanon, controlled Sierra Leone's official diamond
mining. 89 Under Jamil, DIMINCO's legitimate exports dropped
dramatically, and by 1988, DIMINCO was exporting only 48,000 carats.
Jamil apparently had his own followers and ambitions to take care of.
Meanwhile, Momah wanted to create and reward his own
followers and curb the nation's new elite, the Lebanese businessmen.
Jamil and some of his closest advisors were implicated in a 1987 coup
attempt and Jamil fled to London. Momah then invited an Israeli firm to
85 See id. at 145.
86 See Greenhalgh supra note 11, at 220.
87 See PACNET supra note 17.
88 Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead, World Bank Policy Research
Report 241 (Oxford Press, 1994) Table A.15., "GDP per Capita Growth."
89 See PACNET supra note 17.
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control the diamond market and import rice with foreign exchange
earned from diamond sales abroad.90
To keep the economy afloat, Momah entered into agreements
with the Israelis and a structural adjustment program with the IMF and
World Bank. Under the Israelis, diamond exports rose 280% between
1985 and 1986. This allowed Momah to pay IMF arrears and guarantee
the structural adjustment program. From 1987 to 1991, the annual growth
rose to 0.8%.91
But unfortunately this turn for the better was not to last, as the
Israelis, in next to no time, pulled out of the economy by 1987.
Nevertheless, Momah still needed to maintain and co-opt his cronies.
The Israeli pullout and Momah's continued spending resulted in the
government spending more than the tax revenue could cover by 1989.
This imbalance led the government to borrow from the central bank and
to increase the money supply by printing more of it. The hope was that
these measures would help pay for expensive imports like rice.92 Foreign
exchange reserves fell further as export growth was -10.5% from 1981 to
1986. 9' By 1990, inflation was at 106.8%.94 To shore up its diamond
production, 49% of the government's shares in DIMONCO were
privatized.
III. The State Collapses: Sierra Leone from 1991 to the
Present.
A. Government Collapse & Rebellion
Scandal rocked the government in 1991 when it was discovered
that no work had been done on 32 government development contracts
even though $2 million had been spent on those projects.95 In 1991, the
government announced its intention of repurchasing 49% of DIMINCO,
which had been privatized by Stevens. 96 By 1993, the source of diamond
production was mainly small-scale mining. DIMINCO ceased operations
in March 1993 and went into liquidation in October 1993. 97 In January
1994, the government instituted a new mining policy that allowed non-
citizens to form companies while requiring the non-citizens to maintain
90 See Reno supra note 2, at 158.
91 See World Bank-Adjustment supra note 88, at 138.
92 GEORGE AYITTEY, AFRICA IN CHAOS, 258 (1998); World Bank Adjustment, supra note 88, at
171. Meanwhile, spending on health and education from 1980 to 1989 fell 82.8%.
93 See World Bank Adjustment supra note 88, at 249.
94 See id. at 268.
95 See Ayittey supra note 92, at 72.
96 See Minerals Y.B, Vol. III, Mineral Ind. of Afr. (U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 1992) 199-200.
97 See Minerals Y.B, Vol. IV, Mineral Ind. of Afr. (U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 1993) 141-142
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minimum levels, or else their licenses would be revoked. 98 Next, rebels
entered the country through Liberia. Foday Sankoh, the 1971 coup
instigator, whose personal friendship with Charles Taylor, the Liberian
President, gained the rebels safe passage into Sierra Leone through
Liberia, led the rebels. The rebels had left Sierra Leone in 1987 due to
economic turmoil and had been training in Libya. 99 In Libya, Sankoh
teamed up with Ibrahim Bah, a Senegalese, who trained in Libya and had
fought in Afghanistan and then with the Hezbollah Terrorist group in
Lebanon. Bah, a close friend of Blaise Compaore's-the president of
Burkina Faso and future arms supplier to the region-in turn, introduced
Sankoh and another of Africa's infamous rebel leaders Charles Taylor, to
Gaddafi.100 This group of would-be rebel leaders would form an "axis" of
West African instability with its pole being Tripoli.
Once in Sierra Leone, Sankoh set about recruiting disaffected
urban youths, many of whom had not benefited from illegal diamond
digging and the "new economy."1 °1 Sankoh would pay his foreign
friends, like Stevens and Momah did, in diamonds.
The rebels of Revolutionary United Front (RUF) intended to
encircle the regional centers of Bo and Kenema. Bo is 25 miles south of
the former SLST Tongo Lease, which is a 15-mile long vein of
kimberlite diamonds.10 2 The RUF executed those who refused to join
their ranks and kidnapped boys and girls for guerilla training. The RUF
began their hallmark campaign of crude amputations that included feet,
hands, lips, ears, and noses. The focus of these brutal amputations was on
women and children.103 The RUF amputated to usurp the power of the
chiefs and introduce themselves as the new power brokers. The RUF
soon turned to mining and diamonds in order to enrich themselves and
their foreign supporters.
B. Of Guerillas, Diamonds & Mercenaries
By early 1992, the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA), with the
assistance of the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), led by Nigeria and Guinea (who had a
defense pact with Sierra Leone) pushed the RUF back to the Sierra
98 See id. at 141
99 IBRAHIM ABDULLAH & MUANA, PATRICK, THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA
LEONE 176-177 (Christopher Clapham ed.) (1998); L. Renda, Ending Civil Wars: The Case of
Liberia, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 68 (1999).
100 An Axis Connected to Gaddafi: Leaders Trained in Libya Have Used War to Safeguard Wealth,
WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 2, 2001.
101 See Renda, supra note 99 at 177.
102 PAUL RICHARDS, FIGHTING FOR THE RAIN FOREST: WAR, YOUTH AND RESOURCES IN SIERRA
LEONE, 178 (1996).
103 PACNET, supra note 15.
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Leone-Liberia border. In 1992, disaffected SLA soldiers (the leaders
were sent to law school in the U.K. on scholarships after their removal)
launched a coup due to conditions at the front and a lack of pay.10 4 The
coup was successful, and the soldiers instituted a commission to look
into corruption and soon discovered malfeasance at ministerial levels.' °5
Yet, the soldiers also succumbed to graft and corruption in no time.
106
Soldiers sent to the front no longer fought the RUF, but instead turned to
diamond mining.10 7 In October 1992, Koidu, the main town in the
diamond mining areas, fell to the RUF. Seesaw battles raged, and by
early 1995, the RUF had the upper hand.
Facing imminent defeat by mid-1995, the military government
hired Executive Outcomes (EO), a private South African mercenary
outfit consisting of former Apartheid troops, to fight the rebels.'0 8 With
experience gained from fighting South Africa's wars in Angola and
Namibia, EO checked the RUF's advance and in less than a month had
nearly cleared them from the country. 109 Branch Energy, an offshoot-
mining component of EO, was given a 25-year lease on Sierra Leonean
diamond concessions. 1'0 By 1996, EO had killed several thousand RUF
combatants and forced the RUF into peace negotiations.
Sierra Leone had no foreign exchange to speak of, so the
government, as usual, signed away the diamonds to foreigners. In 1996,
allegations began to surface that EO officials were engaged in illegal
mining."' Between 1994 and 1996, Branch Energy had invested $12
million in exploratory mining. EO's success meant that a peace treaty
would be signed in November, but with a provision requiring EO and
ECOMOG to leave by January 1997. As EO prepared to pull out in late
1996, Branch Energy sold its entire stake in Sierra Leone to Diamond
Works, a company with connections to Sandline International Ltd.,
which was itself a mercenary company composed of former British
104 Africa Confidential Special Reports, Chronology of Sierra Leone: How Diamonds Fuelled the
Conflict, available at http://www.africa-confidential.com/special.htm (Last Visited Oct. 12, 2001).
105 See NEW AFRICAN September 1992 at 17.
106 See African Guerrillas supra note 99, at 181.
107 See id. at 182.
108 See id. at 185.
109 See id. at 187; PACNET, supra note 16.
110 Andres Perez, Sierra Leone's Diamond Wars, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, (June 2000),
available at http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/en/2000/06/O2siei-aleone (last visited Oct. 12,
2001); PACNET, supra note 16.
111 Supra.; Africa Confidential supra note 102; Conciliation Resources, Primary Industry and
Conflict in Sierra Leone (1997), available at http://www.c-r.org/occpapers/briefing3.htm (last
visited Oct. 12, 2001).
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Secret Service members. 112 Diamond Works' security would be provided
by Lifeguard, a mining security subsidiary of EO.113
Elections were held in February 1996. EO's success and the new
president helped forge the Abidjan Accords in November 1996, which
ended the war.' 14 The RUF would register as a political party and disarm,
and international observers would keep and monitor the peace.115 Yet, the
U.N. Security Council felt that the Clinton Administration would not
support a U.N. peacekeeping effort in Sierra Leone, and hence, none was
sent.1 16 The RUF failed to disarm or demobilize, and on 25 May 1997,
RUF soldiers overthrew the civilian administration of President Kabbah
and demanded $47 million before restoring the government.1 17 The RUF
assumed power, and Kabbah fled to Guinea and asked Nigeria to
intervene militarily. An orgy of violence gripped Freetown, with
increased murder, rape, looting, and torture, while all formal banking and
commerce operations ceased throughout the country. Even ECOMOG
forces were overpowered.
In February 1998, Kabbah was restored to power by Liberia.1 8
The RUF was pushed into the countryside and exacted its humiliation on
civilians by mutilating thousands more. The rebellion that began in 1991
claimed more than 75,000 lives, caused half a million refugees, internally
displaced 2.25 million people, and left thousands of mutilated people.
C. From U.N. Protection to British Intervention
In 1997 the U.N. Security Council imposed an arms embargo on
Sierra Leone.11 9 The U.N. responded to the deconstruction of Sierra
Leone in July 1998 by creating a peacekeeping operation, named
UNOMSIL, which consisted of 70 observers.1 20 The U.N. Security
112 See Africa Confidential supra note 104; Conciliation Resources, supra note 111.
113 See Conciliation Resources supra note 111.
114 K. Nowrot & E. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore Democracy: International Legal
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2000), available at http://www.web.anmesty.org/ai.nsf/index/AFR510272000 (last visited Oct. 12,
2001); United Nations Department of Public Information, Conflict of Diamonds: Sanctions and War
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Council modified the embargo in 1998 to allow the government to rearm
itself, but maintained the embargo inasmuch as it denied the RUF any
weapons. Regardless, the RUF continued to arm itself through the sale of
illegal diamonds, and from 1991 to 1999, the RUF was estimated to have
earned approximately $200 million a year from diamond smuggling. 121 In
1998 and 1999, five flights carrying weapons from Ukraine to Burkina
Faso-whose president was the Libyan-trained acquaintance of Sankoh,
Compaore-were diverted to the RUF. 122 In 1998 Bah, former Afghan
freedom fighter and Hezbollah member and co-founder of the RUF, met
with operatives of bin Laden's al Qaeda network in order to sell them
diamonds. The connection to al Qaeda was cemented in September 1998,
when Bah arranged for an al Qaeda visit to Monrovia. Bah and Abdullah
flew into Sierra Leone to discuss buying diamonds on a regular basis.
123
A few weeks later Bah arranged a visit for two more al Qaeda operatives
now on the FBI list, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani and Fazul Abdullah
Mohammed-both prime suspects in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings
in Africa-who took $100,000 in cash and received a parcel of diamonds
in an introductory deal.
124
On the military front, in 1998 the RUF launched "Operation
Spare No Soul" targeting civilians because of the capture of Sankoh by
ECOMOG forces.1 21 In January 1999, the RUF attacked UNOMSIL and
ECOMOG troops and reentered Freetown. During two weeks in
Freetown, the RUF torched homes and buildings, murdered 6,000
people, dismembered hundreds and kidnapped 2,000 children before
being repulsed by ECOMOG forces. 126
In July 1999 Kabbah and Sankoh signed the Lom6 Treaty,
ending the rebellion by the RUF. Sankoh was made chairman of the
Strategic Resources Commission, with responsibility over diamond
mining. Anyone who wished to mine diamonds had to go through him to
obtain a license.127 In essence a power shift had occurred, and rather than
the chiefs controlling the issuance of licenses as was once done in the old
121 Swiss Liberian Diamond Imports Rise in Sierra Leone War, REUTERS, Aug. 9, 2000.
122 BBC NEWS, Sierra Leone: The Balance of Forces (2000), available at
http://news.bbe.co.ul/hi/english/ world/africa/newsid_743000/743718.stm (last visited Oct. 12,
2001).
123 Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade: Sale of Gems from Sierra Leone Rebels Raised
Millions, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 2,2001.
124 Id.
125 See EIU Sierra Leone supra note 120, at 24.
126 See PACNET supra note 18.
127 See Le Monde Diplomatique supra note 110; BBC NEWS, A Rebel's Best Friend (2000),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_745000/745194.stm (last visited
Oct. 12, 2001).
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economy, Sankoh would now personally seek to engage in this
kleptocracy. Sankoh set out to sell his own personal collection of
diamonds through the ministry, 128 and rebels came out of the bush selling
their own diamonds.
129
In April and May 2000, the Lom6 Accords fell apart as U.N.
forces came under attack in east Sierra Leone. In April 2000, ECOMOG
(except the Nigerian contingent that came under U.N. command) pulled
out. By May 2000, three key events had occurred: 1) 300 U.N. troops
were kidnapped, leading to the unraveling of the U.N. force; 2) 1,000
British troops and six Royal Naval warships arrived in Freetown to
restore order and train and arm Sierra Leone's army; 3) Sankoh was
arrested. The RUF's leadership, including three ministers, their
spokesman, the secretary general and two colonels, were also arrested.
D. The R UF's Renewable Fuel: "Conflict Diamonds"
The RUF supported their offensives through illegal diamond
mining in the occupied regions, which continued after the Lom6 Treaty
required the RUF to turn over occupied regions to the U.N. 13 0 Like its
predecessors, the RUF was aware of the resources to be had in the
diamond sector. Sankoh lined his pockets and encouraged his cronies-
just like Stevens and Momah before him-to rape the diamond industry
and co-opt the chiefs. Thus, the RUF did the same as others before them,
but co-opted the chiefs through violence. In May 2000 the Sierra Leone
Attorney General charged Sankoh with corruption and diamond
smuggling."'
As for the RUF's diamonds, they were smuggled through the old
smuggling routes to Liberia and sold in RUF-friendly Monrovia. 132 From
1998 to 2000, diamond exports from Sierra Leone were around $30
million while diamond exporting from Liberia-which possesses fewer
diamond fields-exploded to over $300 million. 133 In July 2000, Charles
Taylor, President of Liberia, responded to allegations of his involvement
in arms and diamond smuggling to and with the RUF: "When someone
gets up and says that Liberia is involved in diamond smuggling and gun
128 Corina Schuler, Sierra Leone: Papers Detail Rebel's Guilt, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
1 (May 15, 2000).
129 Diamond Dealers Rush to Sierra Leone to Buy Rebel Diamonds, AFRICAN MINING MONITOR
(Oct. 12, 1999).
130 See A Rebel's Best Friend supra note 127.
131 See Papers Details Guilt supra note 128.
132 BBC NEWS, Liberia's Diamond Links (2000), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/ africa/newsid_839000/839206.stm (last visited Oct. 12,
2001).
133 See A Rebel's Best Friend supra note 127.
237
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. VOL. 10
running like a movie, you've got to be joking. What we have said, is with
all of the Western intelligence-for God's sake, these people have
satellites ... please bring me one photograph of a convoy."'13 4 In August
Western Intelligence, mainly the U.K. and U.S., showed Taylor and the
world his convoys. 135 The evidence was presented to the U.N. Sanctions
Committee, thereby implicating Charles Taylor and Blaise Compaore,
President of Burkina Faso. The evidence included allegations that Taylor
orchestrated the rebels, supplied food, medical supplies, and military
equipment, all in return for 60% of illegal diamonds smuggled out of
Sierra Leone. 36 Burkina Faso, which received around 30% of illegal
diamonds smuggled out of Sierra Leone, made fraudulent end user
certificates for weapons purchased in Bulgaria, which were then diverted
to the RUF. 137 But even the U.N. became tarred when, in September
2000, Nigerian troops, originally part of ECOMOG and later part of the
U.N. operation, were accused of diamond smuggling by the Indian
individual commanding the U.N. force. 138 As late as July 2001 Bah and
the RUF were mining diamonds for al Qaeda operatives.
Presently, Sierra Leone's legal system has collapsed because of
corruption and the recent civil war. The country's institutions for the
administration of justice (both civil and criminal) are barely functional.
The courts in Freetown have no law library for research, recording
facilities, or secretarial staff.139 The court system outside Freetown is
nonexistent, with courtrooms destroyed and personnel killed. There is no
police force to bring perpetrators to justice.1 40 Jails do not provide food
for inmates. The British have provided assistance to the rebuilding effort
by developing programs aimed at re-establishing and training the
national police force. 141
Conclusion
British colonial policy in West Africa created a system of
patronage. Unlike other countries in West Africa, Sierra Leone also had a
134 Id.
135 BBC NEWS, West African Diamond Racket Exposed, available at
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Creole urban population of freed slaves. These Creoles were educated
and given jobs in the civil service. The interior was known as the "white
man's grave," and no systematic effort was made to develop the
hinterland until pressure from another expanding colonial power pushed
the British colonial officials to go to the hinterland to protect Freetown.
Unwilling to pay for the administration of the interior, Sierra Leone
became a hybrid of British Imperialism using both systems employed in
Africa. The discovery of diamonds led to the granting of a monopoly
over the diamonds, in response to colonial protectionism in the face of
the Great Depression. The monopoly followed the colonial policy of
using local chiefs and co-opting them.
At independence, Sierra Leone inherited a system of reliance on
one major export-diamonds. It also inherited the economic dominance
of the Creoles and the subservience of the chiefs. Resentment for the
Creoles, and to a lesser extent, fear of Mende domination, led to Stevens'
political victory. Stevens' rule was akin to Mobuto's in Zaire, but much
less publicized. Where the West financed Mobuto's kleptocracy,
diamonds financed Stevens. Stevens' creation of a new economy
eliminated the inherited monopoly and alienated the Creoles and co-
opted the chiefs. The economy suffered widely as Stevens and his
cronies sought to enrich themselves. This disconnect led to the rise of
frustrated urban youths who eventually became the backbone of
Sankoh's RUF. The RUF needed to finance their movement and what
better way than through diamonds-symbol of the elite that had caused
great misery and had instituted the new "Black Colonialism."
Sierra Leone has now come back full circle. Freetown is the
economic heart of the country with the diamond district tenuously held
by a foreign force-the U.N. The U.N. and the country are watched over
by British troops who do not stray too far from Freetown and leave the
interior as the black man's grave.
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